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ABSTRACT 
 
The impact of an ageing population on the economy is one of the key issues in most 
developed countries.  It is a generally accepted notion that an ageing population could 
cause negative effects, including a decrease of per-capita output and economic welfare, 
on the economy mainly due to the decline of the labor force and aggregate saving rate.  
 The first chapter adopts the two-sector overlapping generation (OLG) model to 
capture the impact of population ageing on the regional economy and compares the 
effectiveness of government policy in an endogenous growth perspective.  Comparing the 
computational results of a one-sector OLG model where agent’s productivity is given 
exogenously, the simulation result confirms that endogenously determined investment in 
human capital significantly offsets the negative effects of the ageing population on the 
regional economy.  The chapter also attempts to check if there is room for the 
government to weaken and prevent the negative effects of the ageing population.  For this, 
this chapter examines the effects of two kinds of government transfer systems on the 
regional economy: money transfer and educational transfer systems.  The money transfer, 
which is redistributed to agents by the government, could be used for an individual’s 
consumption, saving and educational investment.  Educational transfer is given directly 
to the individual proportional to his or her opportunity cost stemming from education 
investment.  The result shows that the educational transfer system is superior to money 
transfer system in the long-run in terms of growth of per-capita income, aggregate 
welfare and stabilizing the factor prices.  However, the results imply that there exists a 
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trade-off relationship in implementing an educational transfer system between economic 
growth and equity of income and wealth.  
 The second chapter seeks to examine the effects of the ageing population in Illinois 
with inclusion of the household’s ex-ante intra-generational heterogeneity across race and 
migration status.  For this, this chapter empirically shows that there are significant gaps in 
returns to education between race and migration status in Illinois; and there exists 
significant relationships between a resident’s demographics and the probability of in- and 
out- migration around Illinois.  These empirical results, including heterogeneous properties 
across race and migration status and demographic- related migration tendency, are 
calibrated into the two-sector OLG model.  Using this two-sector OLG model incorporated 
with the intra-generational heterogeneity over race and migration status, this chapter 
projects the economic growth of Illinois will decelerate substantially until the mid 2020s 
due to population ageing.  After that time, the growth of Illinois will partially recover.   The 
major economic problems of the ageing era stem from the deficiency of the labor force.  
Also the Black’s unemployment rate tends to be substantially high in Illinois.  Taking the 
two labor market- related problems of ageing population and high Black’s unemployment 
into consideration, the government could implement a labor policy measure aiming at 
increasing the employment rate of the Black to the level of the other races through the 
absorption of the unemployed Blacks by offering industry subsidies or incentives.  
However, the result shows that an indirect educational policy, targeting the upgrading of 
the transmission channel of human capital stock from the old generation to the young 
generation of the Black, is more preferable than the direct employment policy in terms of 
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long-run effects on per-capita income and social welfare.  Also, this chapter shows that 
the effects of the government’s immigration policy, which aims at replacing low-
productive international immigrants with native, relatively high-productive unemployed 
individuals who have been unemployed, are very limited in terms of per-capita income, 
welfare and aggregate productivity.  On the contrary, tax and transfer policy inducing 
international immigrants to invest more in their education works relatively better.  
Furthermore, under this policy scheme, the native’s human capital stock also improves 
significantly because of positive spillover effects even though the transfer system’s direct 
beneficiary is the international immigrant group. 
 The third chapter attempts to project the economic paths for the individual 
Midwest states (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio and Wisconsin, as well as the Rest of 
the US) in the future when the population ageing becomes more pronounced.  To 
accomplish this task, a dynamic general equilibrium model is developed so that it could 
incorporate the inter-regional transactions and endogenous growth mechanisms within 
the framework of an OLG model.  Key parameter values associated with the regional 
interconnections were assigned by using multi-regional Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) 
of the Midwest states.  Two different steady-state results were presented with the two 
different age-cohort population structures corresponding to year 2007 and 2030.  These 
steady-state results imply that there should be considerable negative impacts on the 
regional economies in the sense of declining per-capita output.  The rate of declining of 
per-capita output are projected to be heterogeneous across the regions due to the different 
developments of age-cohort population structures and consequently different levels of 
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endogenously determined educational investment of workers.  Furthermore, the regions 
could be grouped separately according to the levels of average human capital stock of 
workers: high-skilled and low-skilled regions, being roughly consistent with actual labor 
productivity statistics.  It is intuitive that the supply-demand interactions between the 
regions should be affected by developments of demographics in each region.  This 
intuition is consistent with the simulation results in the sense that the result revealed the 
development of output price in a certain region reflects the dynamics of demographics of 
every region.  Meanwhile, according to the dynamic simulation, the negative impacts of 
population ageing will not be so severe unlike what was presented in the steady-state 
results.  This mitigation of negative effects could be attributed mainly to the growth of 
human capital stock of workers.  The dynamic simulation results reveal that the per-
capita output of every region is projected to grow positively in the near future when the 
population ageing will be pronouncing.  However, the growth rate of the per-capita 
output is projected to be heterogeneous across the regions: the regions with high-skilled 
workers hold the potential threat that population ageing could give more negative impacts 
on the economy due to the relatively sluggish growth of human capital stock.  Also, the 
dynamic simulation results show that certain regions in Midwest will experience their 
terms-of-trade deteriorate in the near future, implying that careful attention should be 
given to their future trade conditions.   
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Chapter 1 
 
Endogenous Growth of Ageing Economy: Evidence and Policy Measures 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The impact of an aging population on economy is one of the key issues in most 
developed countries.  In particular, the dependency ratio1 of the US is expected to rise 
rapidly until mid 2030’s.  Table 1.1 shows that the ratio in the US is projected to increase 
from 19% in 2004 to 33% in 2035 and then level off at around 33%.  The growth of 
dependency ratio is projected to peak in 2025 and then slow down (figure 1.1).  This 
change of trend reflects the impact of “baby boomers” born in the post-World War II 
period from 1946 through 1964 who will be approaching retirement age sequentially over 
the next two decades; the oldest baby boomers turn 60 in late 2000s and the youngest turn 
60 in late 2020s. The state of Illinois2 also shows similar trends except that the 
dependency ratio of Illinois is anticipated to be less than national ratio (see table 1.1).  
 An aging population could cause negative effects on the economy, including a 
decrease of per-capita output and economic welfare, mainly due to the decline in the 
supply of the labor force and the saving rate: the dissaving of the old should increasingly 
offsets the saving of the young during the ageing era.  Therefore, it becomes important to 
                                                           
1
 Dependency ratio = number of population over 65 / number of population between 15 and 64. 
2
 U. S Census Bureau projected population’s age structure of each state up to 2030 and national 
population’s age structure up to 2050.  
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forecast the impacts of an aging population on the economy and to assess the options for 
government policies that might be needed to address the challenge.  
 A two-sector overlapping generation (OLG) model is developed to capture the 
impact of population ageing on Illinois and compare the effectiveness of government 
policy in an endogenous growth perspective.  The endogenous growth model has 
attempted to endogenize the underlying source of sustained growth.  In the case of a two-
sector endogenous growth model, production of human capital is supposed to be 
relatively intensive in human capital.  Consequently, each individual’s education activity 
plays a key role in economic growth.  For example, in the Uzawa (1965) model, there is 
no physical capital involved in production of human capital while in the Lucas (1988) 
model, the total factor productivity in the final good sector depends on the average level 
of human capital in an economy.    
 Sadahiro and Shimasawa (2002) developed the overlapping generation model 
(OLG) based on two-sector endogenous growth theory in order to project the effects of 
population ageing impact on the economy.  They endogenized the individual’s choice in 
human capital investment at the workplace; and found out that endogenously determined 
investment in human capital offsets significantly the negative effects of ageing 
population.  However, they did not apply their model to an actual population structure; 
and also paid little attention to the role of government policy.  Ludwig et al. (2007) 
extended Sadahiro and Shimasawa (2002) with different formations of human capital 
accumulation.   
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 This chapter is organized as follows.  In section 2, the model description and the 
numerical algorithm will be demonstrated.  In section 3, the computational results of the 
baseline model are presented, compared to those with a one-sector OLG model, which 
does not take endogenous growth of human capital into consideration (this kind of model 
will be referred to as an “exogenous model” later).  In section 4, the government’s policy 
to address the negative effects of ageing population on the regional economy will be 
simulated.  In the final section, the conclusion will be drawn and the further research 
subject will be briefly discussed. 
 
1.2 Baseline Model 
There are three types of agents in the baseline model: representative households, firms 
and government.  The households maximize utility, subject to the usual budget constraint.  
Firms hire labor and rent physical capital to produce physical goods in the competitive 
market.  Government levies pension tax on the workers and operate the social pension 
system of “pay-as-you-go” type with the tax revenue.  A two-sector economy is proposed 
with physical goods and human capital sectors.  The target period is 2001 through 2050 
when the ageing phenomenon is projected to deepen in Illinois as well as the U. S.  It is 
assumed that there is no uncertainty in the economy.  There exist J generations in every 
single year and the generations are overlapped every sample period.3  
  
1.2.1 Households 
                                                           
3
 Thus, we could call this paper’s model as perfect foresight OLG model. 
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At the beginning of age 14, each individual makes a decision on allocating resources on 
consumption and savings as well as splitting the endowment time into schooling and 
working for a whole life-time to maximize his/her life-time welfare.  It is assumed that 
the individual enters into the labor market at age 1 and retire at age *j .  Every agent is 
supposed to live until age J .  The instantaneous utility function has two arguments, 
consumption and investment in human capital: 
1 1
, ,
, ,
( , )
1
t j t j
t j t j
c e
u c e
γ γθ
γ
− −+
=
−
 1γ > , 0 1θ< <  (1.1) 
where 
,t jc is consumption and ,t je  is time fraction of investment in human capital
5
 at time 
t  and age j  while θ is the parameter of the degree of educational investment motive and 
γ is the parameter of the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution.   
 Therefore, the individual’s life-time utility function is as follows: 
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1, 1,1 1 1
1, 1,
1 1
( , )
1
J J
t j j t j jj j
t t j j t j j
j j
c e
U u c e
γ γθβ β
γ
− −
+ − + −
− −
+ − + −
= =
 +
= =   
− 
∑ ∑  (1.2) 
1
tU  denotes the life-time utility of the individual who is born in the year t  and β  denotes 
the parameter of subjective discount rate.  The individual who was born in time t  has a 
following life-time budget constraint: 
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 Note that age 1 in the model corresponds to age 20 in reality. 
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 In the model, the individual whose age is between 1 and *j  allocates his/her endowment time (=1) into 
labor and education investment. Therefore, 
,
0 1t je≤ ≤  for 1,...., *j j= . 
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where tr  is the real interest rate , tw  is the wage rate and 
p
tτ  is the social security tax rate 
at time t  while 
,t jh  is the human capital stock and ,t jpen  is the level of pension benefit at 
time t  and age j .  Every new generation in each year maximizes the life-time utility 
function (1.2) under the budget constraint (1.3).  The Euler equations (1.4) and (1.5) 
could be derived by computing the first order conditions with regard to consumption, 
saving and education investment time: 
( )( )1/1, 1 1 ,1t j t t jc r cγβ+ + += +  (1.4) 
1/
, ,
,
(1 )t j t jpt t t j
e c
w h
γ
θ
τ
 
=   
− 
 if *j j≤ . (1.5)6  
 Note that, in this model, spending time in educational investment is supposed to 
affect agent’s utility in three channels: (1) educational investment time ↑ → utility ↑  
(short-run direct channel), (2) educational investment time ↑ → labor time ↓ → labor 
income ↓ → consumption ↓ → utility ↓ (short-run indirect channel) and (3) educational 
investment time ↑ → human capital stock ↑ → labor productivity ↑  → labor income ↑ → 
consumption ↑ → utility ↑ (long-run indirect channel).  As for the 3rd channel, Heckman 
et. al (1998) revealed that post-school learning, including job search, learning-by-doing 
and workplace education, accounts for 1/3 to 1/2 of all skill formation in a modern 
economy. 
                                                           
6
 Note that we have a boundary condition
,
1t je ≤ . 
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           An individual’s wealth, which comprises accumulated personal saving over time, 
at time t  and age j  (= ,t ja ) evolves as follows: 
1, 1 , , , ,(1 ) (1 ) (1 )pt j t t j t t j t t j t ja h w e r a cτ+ + = − − + + −
 if 1 *j j≤ ≤  (1.6)   
 
1, 1 , , ,(1 )t j t j t t j t ja pen r a c+ + = + + −
 if *j j> . 
           Aggregate supply of physical capital stock at time t  is: 
, ,
1
J
s
t t j t j
j
K a N
=
=∑
 (1.7) 
where ,t jN  denotes population size of age-cohort j  in time t .  The aggregate 
consumption at time t  is: 
, ,
1
J
t t j t j
j
C c N
=
= ∑
. (1.8) 
 
1.2.2 Firm 
The firm produces a composite good by renting physical capital and hiring labor in order 
to maximize its profit each year.  The Cobb-Douglas production function is used with the 
following specification: 
1( ) ( )d e dt t tY A K Lα α−=  (1.9) 
where dtK  the demand of physical capital and 
e d
tL  is the demand of effective labor at 
time t  while A is the parameter of total factor productivity and α  is the parameter of 
physical capital income share.  Factor prices are determined in the competitive market: 
1 1( ) ( )d e dt t tr A K Lα αα δ− −= −  (1.10) 
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and (1 ) ( ) ( )d e dt t tw A K Lα αα −= −  (1.11) 
where δ  is physical capital depreciation rate. 
 
1.2.3 Government 
The government in the baseline economy just operates the social security system; the 
government levies a social security tax on labor income and transfers the pension benefit 
to retirees.  The government’s budget is assumed to be balanced every period: 
( )* , , , , ,
1 * 1
(1 )
j J
p
t t j t j t t j t j t j
j j j
N e w h N penτ
= = +
 
− = 
 
∑ ∑ . (1.12) 
The magnitude of annual pension benefit of a retiree is dependent on his/her average 
yearly (gross) labor income before retirement.  The government transfers a pension 
benefit to a retiree which amounts to his/her yearly average labor income multiplied by 
replacement ratio (ξ ).  
 
1.2.4 Human capital  
Generally an individual’s human capital stock is embodied privately so it has a property 
of rivalry and exclusiveness; the use of embodied skills in one activity precludes their use 
in another activities (“rivalry”) and people have property rights in their own skills 
(“exclusiveness”).  Therefore, to maintain and improve aggregate human capital stock in 
the economy, there should be a transferring mechanism of human capital stock from 
generation to generation; this transferring mechanism is referred to as “education.”  
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Following the human capital production function of Sadahiro and Shimasawa (2002), the 
process may be presented as: 
1
1, 1 , , ,(1 ) ( ) ( )j t h j t t j t j th h B mk h eφ φδ −+ + = − +  (1.13) 
where tk is the physical capital/labor ratio while B is the parameter for accumulation 
efficiency of human capital, m is the portion of physical capital stock for producing the 
human capital stock, hδ  is the parameter of depreciation rate of human capital stock and 
φ  is the parameter of elasticity of human capital formation function.  This human capital 
production function includes the physical capital ratio and the degree of accumulation 
efficiency of human capital stock so that the model could reflect the efficiency of 
education system of the corresponding economy.  Note that there is a need to develop a 
rule of assigning a human capital stock of age 1 individuals of each year.  The proposal of 
Sadahiro and Shimasawa (2002) is adopted so that the new generation is born with a 
portion of human capital stock of the previous generations: 
* *
,1 1, 1, 1,
1 1
/
j j
hc
t t j t j t j
j j
h h N Npi
− − −
= =
  
=    
  
∑ ∑  (1.14) 
where hcpi  is the parameter of efficiency of human capital transmission between 
generations. Aggregate human capital stock at time t  is defined as: 
 
*
, ,
1
j
t t j t j
j
H h N
=
=∑ . (1.15) 
Then, aggregate supply of effective labor can be computed as shown in (1.16): 
*
, , ,
1
(1 )
j
e s
t t j t j t j
j
L e h N
=
= −∑ . (1.16) 
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1.2.5 Market clearing  
Factor and goods market clearing conditions hold at every period as follows: 
( )e s e d et t tL L L= ≡  (1.17) 
( )s dt t tK K K= ≡  (1.18) 
t t t tY C I G= + +  (1.19)7 
where 1(1 )t t tI K Kδ −= − − . 
 
1.2.6 Calibration 
Parameters 
This chapter adopts the relevant parameters from the related previous literature (see table 
1.2).  In particular, the parameters associated with the human capital production are from 
Sadahiro and Shimasawa (2002).  The other parameters are mainly from Park and 
Hewings (2007).  Also note that it is for the period 2001 through 2050 that simulation 
results are presented in the next section.    
 
Age-cohort structure 
As for the age-cohort distribution, calibrated to our model, the U. S. Census Bureau 
(USCB)’s projections that are available up to 2030 are used.  The USCB’s projection are 
extended to 2050, assuming that the correlation of age-cohort structures between Illinois 
                                                           
7
 In this model, tG =0. 
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and the U. S will be equivalent as for the previous period.  Figure 1.2 shows the changes 
of age-cohort structures of Illinois from 2010 thru 2030 to 2050.  The impacts of this 
demographic change will be explored in the next section. 
 
Initial distribution 
One of the difficulties this study should address is how to set the initial distribution of 
wealth and human capital stock in 2001, which is the beginning year of economy of our 
model.  The economy of Illinois was not at a steady state in 2001; hence, this chapter 
shows the another way to address this issue, instead of adopting a steady state distribution 
of wealth and human capital stock as a distribution in 2001.  
 First, for the distribution of human capital stock in 2001, the productivity age 
profile8 adopted by Park and Hewings (2007) was used so that it would be possible to 
compare the simulation results between the one-sector model (“exogenous model”) and 
the two-sector model (“endogenous model”), that have different views on human capital 
and its role on economic growth.  
 Secondly, the initial wealth distribution might be calibrated empirically.  However, 
the impacts of factors9 other than ageing population and government’s fiscal policies 
should be excluded in projecting the economic variables. Thus, the initial wealth 
distribution in an endogenous approach can be generated like the following. It was 
                                                           
8
 Park and Hewings (2007) assumed an individual’s labor productivity to be an exogenous function of 
his/her age: 21 2 3je j jλ λ λ= + −  and calibrated the parameters: 1 2 3, ,λ λ λ .  
9
 For example, uncertainties surrounding the economy affect the saving motive of the consumers 
remarkably in reality. We do not want these uncertainties, which exist outside the model, affect our 
simulation results. 
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assumed that the cross-sectional wealth distribution in 2001 was exactly the same as the 
life-cycle wealth profile of age 1 generation in 2001.  Starting with the arbitrary initial 
wealth distribution then the life-cycle wealth profile of each generation in each period 
can be calculated.  Our interest is in whether the wealth distribution across generations in 
2001 is identical to the life-cycle profile of age 1 generation in 2001.  The fixed-point 
iteration method is used to get the convergence of wealth distribution.  
Wealth distribution across generations in 2001 that is developed by the method 
mentioned above has a usual life-cycle pattern: wealth is accumulated until the retirement 
age and then decreases close to zero since there is no bequest motive in consumer’s 
utility function in the model (figure 1.3).  Again, note that, by assumption and for 
comparison purposes, the initial wealth distribution in 2001 is identical in both of models: 
the exogenous productivity model and the endogenous human capital model.    
 
1.3 Computational Results 
In this section, the simulation result of baseline model will be presented.  The results 
from the endogenous human capital model will be compared to the simulation results of 
the exogenous model in order to derive the implications of the roles of human capital 
during the era of an ageing population.  As mentioned before, the exogenous productivity 
model assumes that the individuals devote his/her whole endowment time into working.  
On the contrary, the individuals in the other model have an incentive of splitting his/her 
endowment time into working and human capital investment. 
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1.3.1 Per-capita output 
During our sample period, i.e., 2001 through 2050, per-capita output continues to grow 
under the endogenous human capital model.  In contrast, under the exogenous 
productivity model, per-capita output increases for the early stage but begins to decrease 
in the early 2010s and then levels off in the late 2030s (see figure 1.4).  Therefore, the 
per-capita output of endogenous human capital model is 24% larger than that of the 
exogenous productivity model in 2050.  Note that the per-capita output of the exogenous 
case is larger than that of the endogenous case for the early years of our sample period 
since the individuals do not devote their whole endowment time into working.  However, 
the increasing productivity of the endogenous case dominates the relative deficiency of 
labor contributions at an early stage. 
 Figure 1.2 showed that the impact of the ageing phenomenon is forecast to be 
most profound during the 2010s and 2020s.  According to the simulation results of the 
endogenous human capital model, per-capita output grows 0.44 and 0.12 percent on 
average during the 2010s and 2020s and then recovers relatively quickly by the 2030s.  
As table 1.3 shows, the improvement of total productivity dominates the negative effect 
of decreases in the labor force in the case of endogenous human capital model.  The 
scarcity of labor decreases the growth of per-capita output by 0.27 percent point and 0.29 
percent point during 2010s and 2020s respectively, while increasing total productivity 
accelerates the output growth by 0.47 percent point and 0.37 percent respectively.  On the 
contrary, the exogenous productivity model forecasts that the economy will suffer the 
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negative growth of per-capita output during 2010s and 2020s and then recover slowly 
from the impact of an ageing population.  
 
1.3.2 Factor prices 
The exogenous productivity model forecasts that factor prices such as interest and wage 
rates will go through considerable change during the phase of ageing population.  In the 
ageing economy, the labor (physical capital) becomes relatively scarce (abundant), 
therefore the factor price of labor (physical capital) moves higher (lower).  However, 
according to the endogenous human capital model, the agents determine his/her life-cycle 
profile of working and time shares of human capital investment, based on his/her 
expectation about future path of each factor prices.  The implications are that the agents 
in the endogenous model tend to increase his/her time share of investment in his/her 
human capital since he/she knows the wage rate (interest rate) will become higher (lower) 
in the future and his/her human capital stock will grow proportionally to his/her 
investment time.10  This kind of mechanism, in the endogenous human capital model, 
makes the factor prices to show relatively stable movements during the ageing period, 
compared to those of the exogenous productivity model.  Figure 1.5 shows the simulation 
results confirming these conjectures. 
 Since ageing does not cause a considerable drop in the interest rate or a rise in the 
wage rate, the aggregate saving rate11 does not decline sharply during the ageing period 
in spite of the same projection of the demographic transition (figure 1.6).  The 
                                                           
10
 See 1.13. 
11
 Saving rate (%) = aggregate saving / aggregate disposable income.  
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endogenous model implies that the aggregate saving rate will drop by 6.6 percentage 
points from 2007 to 2031.  On the contrary, the exogenous model implies that it will 
decline by 11.7 percentage points during the same period.  
 
1.3.3 Welfare 
In this section, the simulation results for social welfare will be presented.  Figure 1.7 
shows the consumption level corresponding to aggregate social welfare.12  Social welfare 
grows gradually in the case of the endogenous model, but it seems to stagnate in the case 
of the exogenous model.  However, it takes a long time for the social welfare of 
endogenous model to catch up with the social welfare of the exogenous model.  
 This result may be ascribed to the fact that the wage rate of the endogenous model 
does not surge as in the case of the exogenous model.  On the other hand, a relatively 
high interest rate in the endogenous model cannot cancel the negative effect of low wage 
rates since young agents enter the labor market without any asset holdings.  Also, note 
that it takes some time to build up the human capital stock to the level that could 
dominate the low wage rate effect.  Thus, the ratio of average welfare of working cohorts 
to the retired cohorts in the endogenous model is relatively low, compared to that of 
exogenous model (table 1.4).  
                                                           
12
 Due to the utility functional format, welfare is computed to be a negative value. Note that magnitude of 
utility does not matter: that is utility should be considered as ordinal, not as cardinal.     
 15 
1.3.4 Sensitivity analysis 
Majority of the parameters are accepted from the previous relevant literature.  In this 
section, the result of sensitivity analysis associated with the key parameter values will be 
presented.  One parameter which will be taken into consideration is the elasticity of inter-
temporal substitution (EIS: 1/γ ), which measures the extent to which household agents 
substitute their consumption inter-temporarily in response to the expected changes in the 
real interest rate in the future.  The other parameters of interest are the efficiency of 
human capital formation ( B ) and retirement age ( *j ). 
 The results show that the per-capita output and its growth are substantially 
influenced with the magnitude of γ  and B .  First, the left panel in figure 1.8 shows that 
the lower EIS (case of γ =2.6) increases the growth rate of per-capita output during the 
ageing era.  However, the effect of lowering EIS attenuates gradually along the years.  On 
the contrary, under the higher EIS (case of γ =1.2), the growth rate was negative most of 
years during 2001 through 2050.  This is mainly because the tendency to defer less 
consumption to the future, which was triggered by the expectation that interest rate 
declines during the ageing era, is promoted by increasing the EIS.  This in turn induce the 
individuals to put less weight on the schooling since the schooling just help the 
individuals to consume more in the future and make consume less in the current period; 
thus the average productivity of the workers (human capital stock) falls, compared to the 
model economy with the lower EIS (right panel in the figure 1.8).   
 Second, the parameter ( B ) connected directly to the efficiency of human capital 
formation significantly affects the performance of the model economy.  When parameter 
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B  is set to be .38, which is .10 points higher than baseline, the growth rate of per-capita 
output becomes substantially higher (figure 1.9).  This matches the intuition quite well 
since the individuals put more weight on their schooling when the return to education is 
higher when every thing is held constant.  However, the whole dynamic pattern of growth 
of per-capita output are similar each other regardless of magnitude of this parameter 
value.  
 Third, as the individuals expect to live longer, they plan to extend their retirement 
age since they need more income to support their lengthened life time unless they 
rationally expect a favorable change in the public pension system.  Also in a point view 
of government, extension of retirement age seem to be desirable since the prime source of 
negative effects of population ageing is the deficiency of labor force.  
 The simulation results reveal that the effects of extending the retirement age 
cannot be ignored in terms of boosting the per-capita output: the per-capita output was 
increased about .5 percent from the baseline when extending one more year of retirement 
age (left panel in figure 1.10).  However the effects are not enlarged along the years; thus 
the growth rate of per-capita output was not affected by extending the retirement age 
(right panel in the figure 1.10).  Furthermore, the growth rate gets the downward pressure 
in the long term by extending the retirement age13.  
 The main reason why the impacts on the economic performance are not 
accumulated inter-temporarily could be traced to the way how the human capital forms in 
the model (see 1.13).  If the retirement age is extended, the young should share the 
                                                           
13 More specifically, after mid 2020s when the ageing phenomenon is forecast to be subdued, the growth rate 
under the model of extending the retirement age is lower than the growth rate of baseline model. 
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educational system, which is the constant portion of physical capital stock according to 
the model specification14, with the old who were not supposed to have participated in the 
education system unless the retirement age was extended; and more condensed 
educational environment lowers the efficiency in building up the human capital stock of 
younger workers.  Furthermore, the elderly who belong to the age-cohort over than 
previous retirement age are less efficient in developing their productivity; and they will 
retire soon.  Therefore, the average labor productivity in the economy gets the negative 
pressure by extending the retirement age. This negative pressure on the average 
productivity is accumulated generation to generation through the human capital 
transmission mechanism.  In case of extending 5 years of retirement age, the average 
productivity declines by .86 percent in the initial year (2001) and decrease by 3.42 
percent in 2050 (table 1.5).   
 
1.4 Government policies 
This section tries to answer the following question: “Which government policy is 
effective to mitigate the effect of ageing population?”  In the last section, we have seen 
that simply extending the retirement age does not guarantee the sustainable growth during 
the ageing era.  One option for effective government policy should be to alter individual’s 
choices so that the equilibrium outcomes should be ones that sustain the higher economic 
growth and social welfare with the same amount of budget.   
                                                           
14 In our model, the physical capital which is used for the education is denoted by tmk  in (13). 
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 In this chapter, the focus is restricted to the tax and transfer policy, more 
specifically, money transfer and educational transfer.  For reference, Seshadri and Yuki 
(2003) explored the effects of a government’s redistributive policy on the equity and 
efficiency in the model economy.  Using the simple two-period stochastic OLG model, 
they showed that the educational transfer enhances the efficiency and reduces the 
inequality in the steady state equilibrium. 
 Money transfer is a kind of redistribution of wealth.  In the simulation used here, 
a lump-sum money transfer is given to each household who is in the working age-cohort 
regardless of its income, productivity and wealth levels.  It could be used as a source for 
consumption, saving and education investment.15   
 Educational transfer is given to an individual proportionally to his/her opportunity 
cost of education investment.  In other words, the primary purpose of educational transfer 
policy is to encourage the agents to invest in their human capital.  The background of this 
policy should be that the average workers who are older than before (thanks to the 
population ageing) should be less active in increasing their investment in their human 
capital due to the low marginal return to schooling; on the contrary the worker’s skill at 
the workplace are rapidly made obsolete under the population ageing.  Grip and Loo 
(2001) classifies skill obsolescence into two categories according to its cause: “technical” 
and “economic” skill obsolescence.  The cause of “technical” obsolescence is found at 
the natural wear of skills; while “economic” skill obsolescence is attributed to the 
                                                           
15
 In our endogenous model, education expenditure is not a direct argument in household’s budget 
constraint, but education time is an argument of utility function. Note that increasing consumption, thanks 
to money transfer, could weaken the incentive of laboring so that agent will increase his/her education time 
fraction. 
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external causes such as technological developments and shifts of the demand for skill 
levels from the industries.  First, it should be obvious that population ageing may cause 
rapid “technical” skill obsolescence in the aggregate level.  Also, there are increasing 
empirical studies showing that the demand for the low skilled is rapidly declining mainly 
due to the fast technical progress (Goldin and Katz, 1998 and Bresnahan el al., 2002).  
Thus, the purpose of educational transfer should be understood as help to decelerate the 
speed of obsolescence of the aggregate skill level in the corresponding economy, caused 
by population ageing, as well as to attach the low-skilled persons to the fast changing 
industrial skill demand.  
 Now, the setup of each sector under each scheme of government policy will be 
presented.  Note that firm and human capital sectors are identical to our baseline model 
and market clearing conditions are straightforward enough to be omitted in this section.  
 
1.4.1 Households 
Educational transfer 
When the government implements an educational transfer system, an agent who was born 
in year t  has a following inter-temporal budget constraint: 
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where µ  is the reimbursement rate, which represents how much portion of opportunity 
cost of an individual’s educational investment is covered by the government’s 
educational transfer, and etτ  is the education tax rate at time t .  The Euler equations (1.4) 
and (1.5) should be modified as follows: 
( )( )1/1, 1 1 1 ,1 (1 )et j t t t jc r cγβ τ+ + + += + −  (1.21) 
( )
1/
, ,
,
(1 )t j t jp et t t t j
e c
w h
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τ τ µ
 
 =
 
− − − 
 if *j j≤ . (1.22)16 
 An individual’s wealth, that is accumulated personal savings over time, at time t  
and age j  (=
,t ja ) evolves by the following equations: 
( )1, 1 , , , , ,(1 )(1 ) (1 (1 ) )p p et j t j t t t t j t j t t t j t ja h w e e r a cτ τ µ τ+ + = − − − + + + − −  if 1 *j j≤ ≤   (1.23) 
1, 1 , , ,(1 (1 ) )et j t j t t t j t ja pen r a cτ+ + = + + − −  if *j j> . (1.24) 
 
Money transfer 
When the government operates the money transfer system, household’s inter-temporal 
budget constraint is as follows: 
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16
 Note that 1p et tτ τ µ+ < − . 
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where 
,t jχ  is the money transfer from government to individual whose age is j  at time t . 
 The individual’s dynamic optimization problem can be solved as:  
( )( )1/1, 1 1 1 ,1 (1 )et j t t t jc r cγβ τ+ + + += + −  (1.26) 
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τ τ
 
 =
 
− − 
 if *j j≤ . (1.27) 
 The individual’s wealth at time t  for workers evolves by the following equation 
while the wealth for the retired agents evolves by (1.24): 
1, 1 , , , , ,(1 ) (1 ) (1 (1 ) )p e et j t t t j t t j t t t j t j t ja h w e r a cτ τ τ χ+ + = − − − + + − + −  if 1 *j j≤ ≤   (1.28) 
 
1.4.2 Government 
When the government operates the educational transfer system, it levies an educational 
tax on household’s income and reimburses proportionally to his/her opportunity cost 
stemming from time spent on educational investment.  It is assumed that the 
government’s social security system and educational transfer system are operated 
independently from each other.  Also the assumption that government’s budget is 
balanced every period is maintained.  Therefore, the budget constraint corresponding to 
the educational transfer system is as follows while the constraint of social security system 
is same as (1.12): 
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 When the government operates the money transfer system, it also levies a tax on 
household’s income and transfers the lump-sum amount to each worker.  Further, the 
government’s social security system and money transfer system are operated 
independently from each other.  The budget constraint of money transfer system is as 
follows: 
( ) ( )* *, , , , , , ,
1 1 1
(1 )
j jJ
e
t t j t j t t j t j t t j t j t j
j j j
N e w h N r a Nτ χ
= = =
    
− + =     
    
∑ ∑ ∑ . (1.30) 
 Note that the economy is simulated under two different government policy 
schemes: educational transfer and money transfer systems.  However, it is assumed that 
the budget volumes of these two systems are identical at every period for comparison 
purpose. 
 
1.4.3 Computational result 
 
1.4.3.1 Per-capita output 
In the short-run, both of the government policy systems decrease per-capita output since 
these transfer systems weaken the incentive to work.  Figure 1.11 implies that the short-
run negative effect is much larger when the government operates an educational transfer 
system than when it operates money transfer system.  For example, the educational 
transfer system which reimburses 30% (20%, 10%) of opportunity cost of educational 
investment decreases per-capita output by 1.99% (1.16%, 0.52%) in 2001, compared to 
the per-capita output of baseline model in 2001.  On the contrary, the money transfer 
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system whose budget volume is equivalent to that of the educational transfer system 
lowers just the output by 0.21% (0.12%, 0.06%) in 2001.  
 However, the government’s transfer system boosts the economy in a long-run.  In 
particular, the positive effect of educational transfer is noteworthy whereas money 
transfer system barely increases the per-capita output even though government expends 
same amount of budget every single year.  For example, educational transfer system 
whose reimbursement rate is 30% (20%, 10%) increases per-capita output by 3.78% 
(2.39%, 1.14%) in 2050, compared to the per-capital output of baseline model in 2050.  
However, the money transfer system increases per-capita output by 0.28% (0.17%, 
0.08%) in 2050. 
 The government’s transfer policy increases the incentive of investment in human 
capital.  This increasing incentive causes an improvement in total productivity in the 
economy and finally boosts the economy during the ageing period.  Table 1.6 shows that 
the educational transfer encourages individuals to allocate more time to schooling than 
the money transfer option does even though the money transfer consumes the equivalent 
government’s budget as the educational transfer system every year.  The educational 
transfer system whose reimbursement rate is 30% (20%, 10%) increases the average time 
share of educational investment by 27.87% (16.04%, 7.10%), compared to the baseline 
model where no transfer policy is involved.  On the other hand, the money transfer 
system increases the time share of education investment only by 3.08% (1.80%, 0.81%), 
compared to the baseline model.  It should be also noticed that individuals devote more 
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time into investing in his/her human capital as the reimbursement rate is higher or 
government transfer more lump-sum money amount to the individuals. 
 
1.4.3.2 Factor prices 
In the last section, notice that when the government implements a transfer policy 
regardless of educational or money transfer, the individuals are encouraged to allocate 
more time into his/her human capital investment.  From this result, it can be assumed that 
the relative scarcity of labor (or relative abundance of physical capital) during the 
demographic transition would be mitigated due to further improvement of productivity if 
the government implements transfer policies.  Table 1.7 confirms these conjectures.  The 
educational transfer system soothes the phenomenon of relative scarcity of labor (or 
relative abundance of physical capital) more effectively than money transfer system does 
although it consumes the same budget volume as the educational transfer system.  Also, 
the mitigating effect is larger as the government transfers more.  
During 2010 through 2030, when the ageing phenomenon peaks, the rise of the 
wage rate (decrease of interest rate) resulting from the scarcity of labor force could be 
weakened if government implements a transfer system to counteract ageing phenomenon 
(figure 1.12).  However, it should be noted that in an early stage of the government’s 
policy implementation, the economy could receive a temporary labor shortage shock 
since agents begin to allocate more time into education than before and total productivity 
is not yet high enough to cover this shortage of labor time.   
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 The educational transfer system is more effective than the money transfer system 
in mitigating less-saving tendency during ageing periods.  Furthermore, the aggregate 
saving rate could be increased more as government reimburses more under the 
educational transfer system (figure 1.13).  On the contrary, there is no notable positive 
effect of the money transfer system regardless of its magnitude.  Again, it should be 
noted that aggregate saving rate could be lower than in the baseline case in an early stage 
of government’s policy implementation because household’s saving drops mainly due to 
decrease of income stemming from the shortage of working hours and the immature 
status of human capital stock. 
 
1.4.3.3 Welfare 
The educational transfer increases social welfare significantly while money transfer’s 
effect is trivial regardless of the magnitude of transfer.  Educational transfers affect social 
welfare through two channels: education and consumption.  Individuals are encouraged to 
spend more time in schooling and this increase in educational investment positively 
affects directly the individual’s welfare.  Furthermore, rising schooling time promotes an 
individual’s human capital stock so that he/she could enjoy more consumption in the 
future.  Since human capital stock has to be accumulated, this positive effect is 
accelerated as time passes unless government changes its policy schemes.  Table 1.8 
shows that a persistent educational transfer system accelerates growth of social welfare.  
The educational transfer system that reimburses 30% (20%, 10%) of the opportunity cost 
of human capital investment promotes 2.70% (1.73%, 0.83%) compared to the baseline 
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case during 2000’s.  During the 2040’s, the educational transfer whose reimbursement 
rate is 30% (20%, 10%) improves social welfare by 6.29% (3.92%, 1.84%).   
  
1.4.3.4 Economic equity 
The simulation results show that the government’s transfer policies do not improve 
equality of income and wealth distribution.  Instead, both of the educational transfer and 
money transfer policies worsen equality of income distribution.  Also, the educational 
transfer policy even deteriorates the equality of wealth distribution.  Note that the money 
transfer improves the equality of wealth distribution but the degree of improvement 
seems to be very small (figure 1.14). 
 It can be seen that the Gini coefficient of income rises more as government 
increases its reimbursement rate and transfers more money.  In the case of the Gini 
coefficient of wealth, the coefficient becomes higher as the government’s reimbursement 
rate of educational transfer system increases while the money transfer lowers the 
coefficient a little.  
 These results imply that the government transfer regime does not work so 
effectively for the agent with low human capital stock while the policy encourages 
efficient agents to invest more effectively in his/her human capital stock.  
 
1.5 Conclusions 
The ageing phenomenon is forecast to peak from 2010 to 2030 in case of Illinois; and it 
has been shown that the population ageing is expected to affect Illinois economy 
negatively.  Nevertheless, the negative effects of an ageing population are smaller in the 
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endogenous model than the forecasts from an exogenous model.  This gap may be 
attributed to the fact that the exogenous model overlooks the roles of human capital stock. 
An individual has a motive to invest in his/her human capital with a sacrifice of current 
loss of labor income since individuals expect that his/her current investment in education 
will pay off more in the future than a current sacrifice.   
 Two kinds of transfer system as government policy measures were explored under 
the same scale of budget: money transfer and educational transfer systems.  The 
educational transfer system is superior to money transfer system in the long-run in terms 
of growth of per-capita income, welfare and stabilizing the factor prices.  However, it 
should be noted that, in the short-run, the drawbacks of the educational transfer system, 
that is decrease of labor time-share, dominated the positive effects of this transfer system 
(promotion of human capital stock) since it takes time for human capital stock to be built 
up enough to cover the impact of the policy’s drawbacks.  Also, policy-makers should 
note that there exists a trade-off in implementing transfer policies between economic 
growth and equality of income and wealth distribution.  
The analysis has shown that there is room for government to help weaken and 
prevent the negative effects of ageing population.  Thus, government should pay careful 
attention to its current fiscal condition so that it could play active role in addressing the 
challenge of population ageing in the near future.  Also the long-term cost/benefits and 
appropriateness of volumes of directly redistributive policies should be sensibly re-
examined ahead of the era of population ageing.     
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 Several points should be mentioned for further study regarding the subjects this 
chapter tried to deal with.  First of all, uncertainty factor should be included in the model 
so that we could draw more realistic implications for government’s policy.  For example, 
in last section where there is a transition of inequality measures, it was assumed that 
human capital stock, asset holding, consumption and time-shares of labor and schooling 
are identical if the agents are in the same age-cohort in the same year.  If individual 
uncertainty factors such as productivity shock and lay-off risks had been included in the 
model (then, we can call this model as heterogeneous stochastic general equilibrium 
model), the individual’s reaction to the policy would have been different from those 
presented.  Also, the specification of government policy could be modified to reflect 
actual policy scheme17 so that it would be possible to derive more applicable results.  
 Secondly, another simulation could be implemented to find out the optimal 
mixture of educational transfer and money transfer for mitigating the negative effects on 
economic growth18 and enhancing the equity of the economy as well.   
 Thirdly, the model should be developed into one that incorporates the changes of 
migration pattern and the productivity-heterogeneity of agents.  It was assumed that the 
productivities of agents in the same generation group are identical in this chapter.  
However, in reality, the productivity, that is called human capital stock in this chapter, is 
extensively different across races and immigration status even though they are in the 
same generations.  Also, when government’s policy is expected to increase the economic 
                                                           
17
 For example, money transfer could be given proportionally to agent’s (revealed) productivity and income 
and tax could be imposed progressively to the agents according to the income level.  
18
 Of course, the objective of economic policy should be different, for example, the objective of transfer 
system could be decreasing of deep concentration of wealth. However, in this paper, we supposed that the 
government’s primary objective is to boost the economy growth in terms of per-capita output.  
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growth, the population structure will become different from that of baseline projection we 
extensively adopted in this study since the impact of government policy could cause 
changes of dynamic migration pattern. 
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Figure 1.1: Growth of dependency ratio of the U. S 
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Figure 1.2: Demographic change of Illinois: change of age-cohort structure 
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Figure 1.3: Initial distribution of wealth (left) and human capital stock (right) 
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Figure 1.4: Per-capita output of Illinois in two different model specifications 
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Figure 1.5: Transition of interest rate (upper) and wage rate 
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Figure 1.6: Transition of aggregate saving rate 
 
 33 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
2001 2006 2011 2016 2021 2026 2031 2036 2041 2046
endogenous model exogenous model
 
Figure 1.7: Consumption level corresponding to aggregate social welfare 
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Figure 1.8: Growth rate of per-capita (left) and transition of average productivity (human 
capital stock) of workers under different EIS (1/ γ ) value assignment 
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Figure 1.9: Growth rate of per-capita output under different parameter values B  
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Figure 1.10: Percentage gap from the baseline (left) and growth rate (right) of the per-
capita output when extending retirement age 
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Figure 1.11: Change of per-capita output from the baseline model 
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Figure 1.12: Transition of interest rate (upper) and wage rate (lower)  
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Figure 1.13: Transition of aggregate saving rate  
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Figure 1.14: Gini coefficient of income (upper) and wealth 
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 Table 1.1: Projection of dependency ratio of the U. S and state of Illinois 
 2004 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
U. S. 0.1858 0.1938 0.2196 0.2509 0.2868 0.3156 0.3277 0.3298 0.3295 0.3330 
Illinois 0.1793 0.1851 0.2068 0.2338 0.2660 0.2910 .. .. .. .. 
Source: U. S Census Bureau 
 
Table 1.2: Key parameter values 
Parameter Description Value Source 
A  Total factor productivity 1.005 Park and Hewings (2007) 
γ  Inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1.91 Park and Hewings (2007) 
J  Life span 65 Park and Hewings (2007) 
*j  Retirement age (=age of working last) 45 Park and Hewings (2007) 
θ  Degree of educational investment motive .012 Sadahiro and Shimasawa (2002) 
β  Subjective discount factor 1.011 Park and Hewings (2007) 
α
 Physical capital income share .34 Park and Hewings (2007) 
B  Efficiency of human capital accumulation .28 Sadahiro and Shimasawa (2002) 
m
 Ratio of physical capital stock .10 Sadahiro and Shimasawa (2002) 
hcpi  Efficiency of human capital transmission 1.0 Sadahiro and Shimasawa (2002) 
ξ  Replacement ratio .50 Park and Hewings (2007) 
 
Table 1.3: Growth rate of per-capita output and contributions of its components (%, %p) 
 
2002-
2010 
2011-
2020 
2021-
2030 
2031-
2040 
2041-
2050 
2002-
2050 
Endogenous case       
Output 1.08 0.44 0.12 0.38 0.47 0.48 
(Physical capital 
stock) 0.24 0.23 0.04 0.10 0.21 0.16 
(Labor force) 0.03 -0.27 -0.29 0.03 0.06 -0.09 
(Total productivity) 0.81 0.47 0.37 0.26 0.21 0.41 
Exogenous case       
Output 0.43 -0.20 -0.55 -0.19 0.02 -0.11 
(Physical capital 
stock) 0.41 0.07 -0.24 -0.21 -0.04 -0.01 
(Labor force) 0.03 -0.27 -0.29 0.03 0.06 -0.09 
   Note: every number is the mean value of each corresponding period.
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Table 1.4: Ratio of welfare between workers and retirees 
 
2001-
2010 
2011-
2020 
2021-
2030 
2031-
2040 
2041-
2050 
2001-
2050 
Endogenous model 0.89 0.67 0.59 0.61 0.67 0.69 
Exogenous model 1.05 0.76 0.63 0.61 0.61 0.73 
       Note: 1. each number is a mean value during corresponding period. 
                 2. Ratio = average welfare of workers / average welfare of retirees 
 
Table 1.5: Percentage gap of average labor productivity from the baseline (%) 
Scenario Retirement age 2001 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
 Extending 1 year 66 -0.12 -0.17 -0.40 -0.61 -0.69 -0.63 
 Extending 3 years 68 -0.44 -0.48 -1.20 -1.82 -2.08 -1.94 
 Extending 5 years 70 -0.86 -0.77 -2.00 -2.99 -3.46 -3.42 
 
Table 1.6: Change of average time-share of human capital investment from the baseline 
model (%) 
 2001-
2010 
2011-
2020 
2021-
2030 
2031-
2040 
2041-
2050 
2001-
2050 
Educational transfer       
10% 6.41 6.84 7.31 7.48 7.48 7.10 
20% 14.35 15.36 16.54 17.00 16.95 16.04 
30% 24.55 26.55 28.88 29.77 29.63 27.87 
Money transfer       
10% 0.72 0.76 0.82 0.88 0.86 0.81 
20% 1.57 1.70 1.87 1.96 1.93 1.80 
30% 2.61 2.85 3.21 3.37 3.37 3.08 
   Note: In case of money transfer, 10% (20%, 30%) means that total amount of money transfer 
from government to the household sector is same as that of educational transfer whose 
reimbursement rate is 10% (20%, 30%). 
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Table 1.7: Change of physical capital-labor19 ratio from the baseline model (%) 
 2001-
2010 
2011-
2020 
2021-
2030 
2031-
2040 
2041-
2050 
2001-
2050 
Educational transfer       
10% 
-0.13 -0.72 -0.71 -0.62 -0.50 -0.54 
20% 
-0.24 -1.53 -1.52 -1.33 -1.08 -1.14 
30% 
-0.32 -2.44 -2.45 -2.18 -1.77 -1.83 
Money transfer       
10% 
-0.04 -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 
20% 
-0.09 -0.29 -0.29 -0.28 -0.26 -0.24 
30% 
-0.16 -0.48 -0.50 -0.48 -0.46 -0.42 
   Note: In case of money transfer, 10% (20%, 30%) means that total amount of money transfer 
from government to the household sector is same as that of educational transfer whose 
reimbursement rate is 10% (20%, 30%). 
 
Table 1.8: Change of aggregate welfare from the baseline model (%) 
 2001-
2010 
2011-
2020 
2021-
2030 
2031-
2040 
2041-
2050 
2001-
2050 
Educational transfer       
10% 0.83 1.09 1.38 1.63 1.84 1.36 
20% 1.73 2.29 2.90 3.46 3.92 2.86 
30% 2.70 3.60 4.62 5.53 6.29 4.55 
Money transfer       
10% 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.20 
20% 0.37 0.39 0.44 0.48 0.50 0.44 
30% 0.62 0.65 0.74 0.81 0.84 0.73 
   Note: In case of money transfer, 10% (20%, 30%) means that total amount of money transfer 
from government to individuals is same as that of educational transfer whose reimbursement rate 
is 10% (20%, 30%). 
 
                                                           
19
 Productivity-adjusted labor. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Endogenous Growth of the Ageing Economy with Intra-Generational Heterogeneity  
over Race and Migration Status   
 
2.1 Introduction 
Overlapping generation (OLG) models have been used extensively to study the impacts of 
population ageing on the economy.  Included in this set are the analyses of Sadahiro and 
Shimasawa (2002, 2004), Park and Hewings (2007), Ludwig et al. (2007).  In these studies, the 
household agents belonging to the same generation have identical parameter values and asset 
endowments.  That is, the only heterogeneity factor in the model is the agent’s age or generation.  
Therefore, the solutions of household agents’ optimization problems are necessarily identical if 
they belong to same generation.   
 As a breakthrough in the development of a heterogeneous agent model in a dynamic 
general equilibrium context, Aiyagari (1994) proposed the model where each agent is of measure 
zero and lives infinitely.  In his model, agents are ex-ante homogeneous but ex-post 
heterogeneous, depending on the sequence of realizations of uninsurable idiosyncratic earnings 
shock.  The history of realized earning shocks naturally leads to borrowing constraints on 
individuals; consequent fluctuations in consumption can be mitigated only by precautionary 
individual savings.  Since agents’ histories of earning shocks are different, the equilibrium 
exhibits cross-sectional distributions of wealth, saving and consumption.  Huggett (1996) 
adopted this ex-post heterogeneity framework within the overlapping generation model to 
compare the age-wealth distribution to the corresponding distributions in the US economy. 
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However, these papers restrict attention only to the steady state equilibrium since solving this 
kind of model is computationally very intensive. 
 Alternatively, Kotlikoff et al. (2002) adopted ex-ante heterogeneity within the perfect 
foresight overlapping generation framework for analyzing distributional effects of social security 
alternatives.  Their model incorporates intra-generational heterogeneity in the form of twelve 
lifetime-earnings groups: each group has its own initial skill level and its own longitudinal age-
skill profile.  They showed that privatizing social security can generate significant long-run 
economic gains in the US.  This model and its methodology was adopted by various studies, 
which focused primarily on effects of public pension reforms for the developed countries in 
which fiscal pressures on the pension system are arising due to population ageing.  A typical 
analysis would be that of Börsch-Supan et al. (2002) for Germany.  In this paper, members of 
same generation are sorted into the categories of employment, unemployment, non-participating 
and retirement to track the evolution of the aggregate labor supply.  However, this model 
assumes each agent’s earning ability is an exogenous function of her age and/or type, without 
paying little attention to the role of endogenous growth of human capital stock. 
Endogenous growth of human capital stock under population ageing was extensively 
discussed in Sadahiro and Shimasawa (2002) and the previous chapter 1.  The first chapter 
showed that the policy measure which encourages an agent to invest more in education is very 
effective in mitigating the negative effect of population ageing on the regional economy; but the 
policy that focuses on the redistribution of wealth cannot address the challenge of population 
ageing in terms of per-capita income, welfare and equity of income distribution. 
 This chapter seeks to examine the effects of ageing population with inclusion of 
household’s ex-ante intra-generational heterogeneity across races and migration status, extending 
 42 
the analysis presented in the first chapter.  In addition, this chapter compares the effects of policy 
alternatives in terms of enhancing the per-capita income and welfare under population ageing.  
This chapter is organized as follows.  In the section 2, gaps of return to schooling are estimated 
across races and migration status with a stylized Mincer wage regression.  An attempt is made to 
explore the relationship between an individual’s demographic profile and in- and out- migration 
probability with a focus on Illinois.  Section 3 contains a description of the model, within which 
the impact of population ageing and effects of policy measures will be analyzed later.  Section 4 
describes the calibration procedure with the empirical results.  The computational results will be 
presented in the section 5.  Section 6 concludes the chapter 2. 
 
2.2 Empirical evidence  
 
2.2.1 Heterogeneity of return to education 
Persistent efforts have been made to analyze differentials by race and migration status in the 
labor market performance in the field of labor economics.  In particular, the return to educational 
investment plays a key role in labor issues such as allocation of resources, determinants of 
income inequality and explanation of past growth rate and so on.  For example, Altonji and 
Blank (1999) adopted a Mincerian regression to show that there were ongoing and significant 
race differences in the labor market, even after controlling for occupational and industry location.  
They showed that the returns to education for blacks are actually stronger than for whites, but the 
returns to experience are substantially lower, more than offsetting the advantage in educational 
returns.  Bratsberg and Terrell (2007) examined rates of return to education of immigrant groups 
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by country of origin, revealing the relationship between attributes of a country’s educational 
system and the rate of return to schooling received by US immigrants from that country.   
 As briefly described above, the Mincer (1958, 1974) model has been extensively adopted 
in empirical studies to estimate returns to schooling years and to explain the factors that generate 
wage gaps between interested groups.  The Mincerian model can be stylized as: 
2
0 0 1log[ ( , )] sw s x s x xα ρ β β ε= + + + +         (2.1) 
where ( , )w s x  are earnings at schooling level s and working experience x  and sρ  is the 
marginal effect of schooling or returns to education.  In the present chapter, a Mincerian 
regression model is adopted to estimate different returns to education across migration status and 
race in Illinois.  The sample data for this analysis (see table 2.1) is obtained from the American 
Community Survey (ACS, 2007).  It should be noted that all household members such as spouse, 
children and parents are included in the analysis if they are more than 18 years old.  However, 
individuals who reported that they were not employed or not in the labor force were excluded.   
The sample was segregated into four comparison groups according to its migration status, 
comparing current location with residence in the prior year: individuals were grouped into (i) 
those who remained in Illinois, (ii) migrated into Illinois from the other states, (iii) migrated into 
Illinois from other nations and (iv) moved out of Illinois.  Also, the residents in Illinois were also 
divided into three groups according to race (white, black and others). 
 The first Mincerian regression is as follows:  
log(annual earnings) = β0 + β1 age + β2 age + β3 schooling       year + residual.  (2.2) 
Here, β3 measures returns to education.  
 There is a technical but important problem that needs to be addressed: measurement of 
schooling years.  Since the Census Bureau does not provide the schooling year data but 
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respondent’s degree or diploma based information, this has to be transformed into schooling 
years.  One option would be to use the following tabulation between Census Bureau’ educational 
attainment data and schooling years (see table 2.2).  In this tabulation, schooling year is assigned 
as a mean value of each category in table 5 of Jaeger (2003) except the categories of professional 
and doctorate degrees. 
 The estimation results imply that there exist significant gaps in the returns to education 
over the migration status (1st-3rd column in table 2.3.1) and races (1st-3rd column in table 2.3.2).  
The coefficients of schooling years were 0.190 (domestic immigrants) > 0.129 (natives) > 0.109 
(international immigrants) and varied by race as follows: 0.166 (black) > 0.137 (white) > 
0.091(others).   
 However, one should be very cautious in interpreting these estimation results.  First of all, 
there should be recognition of the role of the institutions in the society that encourage 
employment of particular demographic groups; then the scarcity of labor belonging to those 
groups tends to increase the return to schooling.  Secondly, overall distribution of earnings across 
schooling years for blacks should be lower than whites even though the return to schooling for 
blacks is higher than whites.  To explore this issue, the following alternative regressions were 
run with the dummy variables of migration status and races.  Therefore, the regression 
specifications are: 
log(annual earnings) = constant + β1 age + β2 age2 + β3 schooling year + β4 d_int’l + β5 d_domestic (2.3) 
log(annual earnings) = constant + β1 age + β2 age2 + β3 schooling year + β4 d_black + β5 d_others   (2.4) 
 Note that there exist notable negative effects from the dummy variables on earnings in 
Illinois (last columns in tables 2.3.1 and 2.3.2).  For example, the coefficients for the dummy 
variables, representing domestic and international immigrants, were -0.121 and -0.485 
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respectively; the coefficient for the dummy variable representing the black was -0.266.  These 
results, in particular, verify that the overall distribution of earnings over ages of blacks is notably 
low even though the returns to education for blacks are very high.  These findings are largely 
consistent with Altonji and Blank (1999). Further, one could conjecture from these results that 
overall earning’s distribution over ages of the international immigrant is also quite low compared 
to the other migration status groups. 
    
2.2.2 Migration and demographics 
Immigration: From ROUS to Illinois 
Within the literature that has evaluated the migration associated with demographic issues, Frey 
(1995) analyzed in- and out-migration patterns of California from 1990 Census data.  In his 
paper, he discovered that California’s out-migration consists of two different systems: first, the 
exporting lower income and less-educated residents to near-by states and secondly, the 
redistribution of better-educated and higher income migrants with the rest of the US.  Meyer and 
Speare  (1985) showed that mobility behavior is associated with socio-demographic 
characteristics, using a longitudinal data set of Rhode Island from the Census.  For example, 
younger, married, and more affluent elderly are more likely to select out-of-state migration.  In 
case of recent analysis on Illinois, Yu (2009) describes the migration patterns of Illinois such as 
the average household income of in- and out- migrants of Illinois, using the Internal Revenue 
Service migration data for 1992 through 2006.  She revealed that there is a notable discrepancy 
of income level of domestic and international in- and out- migrants of Illinois; further, she noted 
that, on average, $1,682 million dollars of personal income drains out of Illinois per year.  The 
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literature reveals that migration is deeply affected by residents demographic and skill factors 
including age, schooling years and household income. 
 To explore the issue further, a binary logit regression model, whose dependent variable is 
whether the individual selected Illinois or not, was estimated, where move-in (=1) or no move-in 
(=0).  The analyzed sample is composed of individuals who did not live in Illinois one year ago 
and have ever moved between states for the previous one-year.  Individuals younger than 18 
years old were excluded.  Attention was directed to estimating the probability of mobility with 
demographic and skill factors, which are related with age, income and schooling years.  In the 
next section, the empirical results of this section will be used in the calibration of the dynamic 
OLG model.  
The regression specification is as follows:  
logit (prob. of move into Illinois) =  constant +  γ1 age + γ2 log(household income) + γ3 schooling 
years + γ4 d_int’l + residual          (2.5) 
where  d_int’l represents an individual who lived outside the US in previous year. 
 The estimation results imply that the probability of moving into Illinois from ROUS is 
inversely related to age and household income, but positively related to years of schooling.  
Further, international immigrants have a higher probability of choosing Illinois as their 
destination than domestic residents (table 2.4). 
Now, to check the expected probability of moving into Illinois, the other explanatory variables 
are set equal to their mean values except the age and dummy variables.  Figure 2.1 plots the 
expected probability of moving into Illinois according to an individual’s age. The results reveal 
that a domestic resident who is 40 years old, who is going to move between states, choose 
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Illinois as a destination with the probability around 3%.  However, the expected probability 
declines gradually as the individual ages.  
 
Out-migration: From Illinois to ROUS 
A similar binary logit regression model was created to explore out-migration, whose dependent 
variable is whether the individual moves out of Illinois: move-out (=1) and no move-out (=0).  
The sample is restricted to individuals who lived in Illinois the previous year and has moved 
within and between states for the previous year.  The binary logit regression is specified as 
follows: 
logit (prob. of move out from Illinois) =  constant +  γ1 age + γ2 age2 + γ3    log(household 
income) + γ4 schooling years + residual.       (2.6) 
 The estimation result reveals that there exist a slight quadratic relationship between age 
and probability of emigrating out of Illinois (table 2.5).20  Note that the sign of the coefficient of 
logged household income is positive.  This positive sign should be compared with the result of 
in-migration analysis (case of ROUS → IL) in the previous section, where the coefficient of 
logged household income was negative.  This result implies that there is a reverse effect of 
household income level on in- and out- migration to Illinois.  Lower income residents outside 
Illinois have a higher probability of migrating into Illinois than higher income residents.  On the 
contrary, higher income residents in Illinois are more likely to migrate out of Illinois than lower 
income residents.  These results confirm the findings of Frey (1995) and Yu (2009) even though 
Frey (1995) analyzed case of California. 
                                                 
20
 If we insert the squared age as explanatory variable in case of the regression of ROUS → IL which is analyzed 
above, the coefficient estimate is not statistically significant.   
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 Again, to check the expected probability of moving out of Illinois, the other explanatory 
variables are set equal to their mean values except age.  The expected probability declines until 
the individual is about 50 years old and then increases afterwards21 (see figure 2.2).   
 However, the overall shape of this expected probability seems to be partially counter-
intuitive: the probability of migrating out of Illinois peaks at the age-cohort over than 80 years 
and more.  This odd shape of expected probability comes from the fact that the magnitude of the 
explanatory variable age2  in the binary logit model accelerates rapidly as the age approaches to 
80+ ; and this inflated magnitude of covariate age2 and its positive coefficient dominates the 
effects from the other explanatory variables.  Note that the data including the individual who is 
80+ is relatively small in the sample; thus the regression result itself was not affected 
significantly by the data whose individual’s age is 80+.  Thus the alternative binary response 
model was adopted to deal with this problem in the expected probability as follows: 
logit (prob. of move out from Illinois) =  constant +  d_age_cohort 'β + γ1  log(household 
income) + γ2 schooling years + residual.        (2.7) 
where d_age_cohort is composed of dummy variables representing the age-cohort group such as 
below 30, 30-40, 40-50, 50-60, 60-70, 70-80 and 80+.  The results imply that there still exits the 
quadratic relationship between age and out-migration probability until age 70; but the probability 
of out-migration drops substantially after age 70 (table 2.6).  Note that the sign and magnitude of 
logged household income and schooling years are largely consistent with the former binary 
regression.  Figure 2.3 shows the expected probability along the age-cohort group by using this 
binary regression results.  The high expected out-migration probability between 60 and 80 could 
be interpreted as the high frequency of retirement migration to the other states from Illinois. 
                                                 
21
 Further studies could be focused on analyzing quantitatively what forces drive this quadratic relationship between  
age and mobility. For example, individuals’ participation in searching jobs during early years and amenity 
accessibility after retirement age would affect age and out-migration pattern.   
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 The empirical result presented in this section reveals that there are statistically significant 
gaps in the returns to education between the agents belonging to different races and migration 
status in Illinois.  This empirical evidence will be incorporated into the intra-generational 
heterogeneous OLG model, whose specification will be described in the next section.  Also, the 
results indicated that there are linear and quadratic relationships between age and probability of 
in- and out- migration in Illinois.  These results will be used for projecting the composition of 
residents of Illinois in terms of migration status in the second model.  
 
2.3 Model descriptions 
 
There are three types of agents in the baseline model: households, firms and government. The 
households maximize utility, subject to the usual budget constraint.  Household agents 
participating in the labor market at age 1 (that is, age category 1) would continue to participate in 
the market until retirement age and non-participating agents would continue to remain outside 
the market.  Hence, it is assumed that there is no change in labor market status over a lifetime.  
We assume that there are no unemployed individuals if they participate in the labor market.  
Firms hire labor and rent physical capital to produce physical goods in a competitive market.  
The Government levies a pension tax on the workers and operates the social pension system of a 
“pay-as-you-go” type with the tax revenue.  There are two sectors in the economy: physical 
goods and human capital sectors.  The target period is 2001 through 2050 when the ageing 
phenomenon is projected to assume greater importance in Illinois as well as the US.  There are 
no uncertain factors in the economy.  There exist J generations in every single year: the 
generations are overlapped every sample period. 
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2.3.1 Households 
We suppose that households are heterogeneous in their returns to education.  This intra-
generational heterogeneity depends on their race (in the 1st model) or migration status (in the 2nd 
model) even though they belong to same age-cohort.  It is assumed that the individual enters into 
labor market at age 1 and retires at age *j .  Every agent is supposed to live until age J .22   At 
the beginning of age 1, each agent, who will continue to participate in labor market, makes a 
decision on allocating resources between consumption and savings as well as splitting the 
endowment time into schooling and work for a whole life-time to maximize his/her life-time 
welfare.  The instantaneous utility function has two arguments, consumption and investment in 
human capital:23 
1 1
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t j t j
c e
u c e
γ γθ
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where 
,t jc is consumption and ,t je  is time fraction of investment in human capital
24
 at time t  and 
age j  while θ is the parameter of the degree of educational investment motive and γ is the 
parameter of inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution.  Hence, consumption 
involves a decision about expenditures now as opposed to saving to facilitate consumption later.  
 The individual’s life-time utility function as following: 
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22
 Note that age 1 in the model corresponds to age 20 in reality. 
23
 If a formula or equation does not denote the race or migration group, the formula or equation is applied to all races 
or migration groups in an identical way. 
24
 In the model, the individual whose age is between 1 and *j  allocates his/her endowment time (=1) into labor and 
education investment. Therefore, 
,
0 1t je≤ ≤  for 1,...., *j j= . 
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where 1tU  denotes the lifetime utility of the individual who is born in the year t  and the 
parameter β  denotes the subjective discount rate.  The individual who was born in time t  has a 
following inter-temporal budget constraint: 
2 2*
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where tr  is the real interest rate , tw  is the wage rate and 
p
tτ  is the social security tax rate at time 
t  while 
,t jh  is the human capital stock and ,t jpen  is the level of pension benefit at time t  and 
age j .   
Every new generation in each year maximizes the lifetime utility function (2.9) under the 
budget constraint (2.10).  The Euler equations (2.11) and (2.12) could be derived by computing 
the first order conditions with regard to consumption, saving and education investment time: 
( )( )1/1, 1 1 ,1t j t t jc r cγβ+ + += +          (2.11) 
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 (2.12)25  
An individual’s wealth, which, in this model, means accumulated personal saving, at time 
t  and age j  (=
,t ja ) comprises the following components: 
1, 1 , , , ,(1 ) (1 ) (1 )pt j t t j t t j t t j t ja h w e r a cτ+ + = − − + + −  if 1 *j j≤ ≤      (2.13)   
 1, 1 , , ,(1 )t j t j t t j t ja pen r a c+ + = + + −  if *j j> . 
                                                 
25
 Note that we have a boundary condition
,
1t je ≤ . 
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The aggregate supply of physical capital stock at time t  is:  
( )
, ,t j t j
s q q q
t
q j
K a v N=∑∑           (2.14) 
where q denotes races or migration status, 
,t j
qN  denotes population size of age-cohort j  in time t  
belonging to group q and 
,t j
qa  denotes savings of agents of age-cohort j  in time t  belonging to 
group q and qv  denotes labor-market participating rate of group q. 
Also aggregate consumption at time t  is:  
( )
, ,t j t j
q q q
t
q j
C c v N= ∑∑          (2.15)  
where 
,t j
qc  denotes consumption of agents of age-cohort j  in time t  belonging to group q. 
 
2.3.2 Human capital  
We follow the human capital production function of Sadahiro and Shimasawa (2002): 
,
1
1, 1 , ,(1 ) ( ) ( )j tq q q q qj t h t j t j th h B mk h eφ φδ −+ + = − +         (2.16) 
where tk is the physical capital/labor ratio while 
qB is the parameter for accumulation efficiency 
of human capital applied to group q, m is the portion of physical capital stock for producing the 
human capital stock, hδ  is the parameter of depreciation rate of human capital stock and φ  is the 
parameter of the elasticity of the human capital formation function.  Therefore, we assume that 
some portion of physical capital is needed for accumulating the human capital, in addition to the 
schooling investment.  The next step involves developing a rule of assigning a human capital 
stock for age 1 generation of each year.  Following Sadahiro and Shimasawa (2002), it is 
 53 
assumed that the new generation is born with a portion of human capital stock of previous 
generations according to the following scheme: 
( ) ( )1, 1, 1,* *,,1
1 1
/
t j t j t j
j j
q hc q q q q q q
t
j j
h h v N v Npi
− − −
= =
  
=    
  
∑ ∑       (2.17) 
where ,hc qpi  is the parameter of efficiency of human capital transmission applied to group q. 
Now, define aggregate human capital stock at time t  as: 
( )
, ,
*
1
t j t j
j
q q q
t
q j
H h v N
=
=∑∑ .          (2.18)  
Then, the aggregate supply of effective labor can be computed as: 
( )
, , ,
*
1
(1 )
t j t j t j
j
e s q q q q
t
q j
L e h v N
=
= −∑∑ .        (2.19) 
 
2.3.3 Firms 
Each firm produces a composite good by renting physical capital and effective labor in order to 
maximize its profit each year.  A Cobb-Douglas production function is adopted that has the 
following specification: 
1( ) ( )d e dt t tY A K Lα α−=           (2.20) 
where dtK  the demand of physical capital and 
e d
tL  is the demand of effective labor at time t  
while A is the parameter of total factor productivity and α  is the parameter of the physical 
capital income share.  Factor prices are determined in the competitive market: 
1 1( ) ( )d e dt t tr A K Lα αα δ− −= −           (2.21) 
and  
(1 ) ( ) ( )d e dt t tw A K Lα αα −= −           (2.22) 
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where δ  is physical capital depreciation rate. 
 
2.3.4 Government 
The government operates the social security system: government levies a social security tax on 
labor income and transfers the pension benefit to retirees.  The government’s budget is assumed 
to be balanced every period: 
( )( ) ( )
, , , , ,
*
1 * 1
(1 )
t j t j t j t j t j
j J
p q q q q q q q
t t
q j q j j
v N e w h v N penτ
= = +
 
− = 
 
∑∑ ∑ ∑ .     (2.23) 
The magnitude of the annual pension benefit of each retiree is dependent on his/her average 
yearly (gross) labor income before retirement.  The Government transfers a pension benefit to a 
retiree which amounts to his/her yearly average labor income multiplied by replacement ratio 
(ξ ).  
 
2.4 Calibration  
This chapter uses the same parameter values as the first chapter except for the parameters of 
return to education (B), degree of efficiency in transmitting human capital stock from generation 
to generation ( hcpi ) and labor-market participation rate (v) as well as the initial human capital 
stock distributions.    
 Now we suppose there are two different OLG frameworks where the transition path of 
the Illinois economy will be presented in both cases.  In the first model, there are three categories 
of race: white, black and others so that it is possible to incorporate the heterogeneity of agents 
over race.  In the second model, heterogeneity of households across migration status is 
incorporated.   
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2.4.1 First model: heterogeneity over race 
The age-cohort population structure from 2001 to 2050 is identical to the one used in the 
previous chapter.  Thus, in this model, the ageing phenomenon will be accelerated until the mid 
2020s and it will be subdued substantially in the mid 2040s.26   The Census Bureau’s population 
composition ratio by race in the state of Illinois (table 2.7) provides the benchmark for the racial 
composition of the population.  
 In the model, the percentage of Others increases by 0.30%p every year from 2000, as a 
result of a rapid increase of immigration of Others (especially Latinos) into Illinois in recent 
decades.  For example, in 2001, the percentages of White, Black and Others were 73.24%, 
15.06% and 11.70% (=11.40% in year 2000 + 0.30%p) respectively.  The composition ratio of 
races incorporated into the model is presented in figure 2.4. 
 It is assumed that the labor earnings per a unit of working time reflect labor productivity 
of the corresponding worker perfectly.  The value of the parameter B of each race should be 
consistent with the exponentials of coefficients of schooling       year  from table 2.3.2 (1st to 3rd 
column).  Therefore, the values were assigned from table 2.8.  The value of B in the previous 
chapter was 0.28; thus, the assignment of the parameter values is made so that the average of 
parameter value weighted by each race’s composition ratio is 0.28. 
 In section 2, it was noted that Black’s marginal return to schooling is the highest.  
Nevertheless, the race effect (that is, the coefficient of the racial dummy) of Blacks on earnings 
is the lowest among the three racial categories.  This could be a consequence of notable gaps in 
the average human capital stocks belonging to young generations of each race.  In other words, 
although Black’s marginal return to investment in schooling is very high, young black people’s 
                                                 
26
 See section 1 of the previous chapter 1. 
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human capital stock is relatively low.  To calibrate this interpretation into the model, different 
values for the parameter hcpi are assigned across races (table 2.9).  Note that this parameter 
determines the level of transmission of human capital stock from proceeding generation to the 
new generation.27  The dependent variable of the Mincer regression in the section 2 was the 
logarithms of earnings.  Thus, the difference of estimation results between races, denoted by 
dummy variable and its coefficient, could be interpreted as the overall percentage gap of 
earnings between races28.  Again, the weighted average of this parameter value is set equal to the 
values in the previous chapter (=1.0).  Also, the initial human capital stock distribution over ages 
was assumed to be heterogeneous between races; but their average values should be same as that 
in the previous chapter.  See the appendix for the assumptions and estimation procedure of the 
initial human capital distribution of each race. 
 In order to derive the labor-market participation rate for each race, the average value for 
civilians (age≥20) during 2003-2008 in US was adopted.  Since the model assumes that someone 
participating in the labor market is always employed, the labor participation rate applied to the 
model is defined as follows: 
Labor market participation rate = (labor force-unemployed persons) / population.   
Therefore, the labor market participation rates ( qv ) were set to be 65.09% for Whites, 61.49% 
for Blacks and 65.78% for Others group (table 2.10).  
 
2.4.2 Second model: focused on Migration 
                                                 
27
 This paper assumes that current young generation’s initial human capital stock is transmitted from the old  
generation whose race group was identical to the young generation. 
28
 log(1+x)≈x when x is small. 
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In the second model in this chapter, unlike the first model, estimation of the age-population 
structure of Illinois in the future is assumed to be not provided;29 only the initial year distribution 
is known, that being for 2001.  Instead, the age-cohort structure of Illinois is assumed to be 
basically maintained.  That is, number of population of age-1 cohort in 2010 multiplied by (1-
death rate) is same as the number of population in age-2 cohort in 2011.  In the second model, 
this will be referred to as basic population structure of Illinois.  However, the population 
structure will be affected by migration so that the actual age-population structure will be 
significantly different from the basic population structure.  The following procedure is used to 
forecast the age-population structure: 
 
# of population belonging to age j in time t in Illinois  
      =  (1- death rate of age j-1) ×  # of population belonging to age j-1 in  
             time t-1 in Illinois   
          +  # of domestic immigrants of age j in time t to Illinois 
          +  # of international immigrants of age j in time t to Illinois 
          -  # of out-migrants of age j in time t from Illinois     
 
 The expected number of domestic and international in-migrants to Illinois and out-
migrants from Illinois can be estimated by using the empirical result of section 2.  For example, 
the following projection strategy could be adopted for estimating the number of domestic in-
migrants in the future.  First, the projections of the national age-cohort population structure in 
the future are available from the US Census Bureau.  By using ACS (2007) data, it is possible to 
compute the nation’s yearly ratio of individuals per age-cohort who move between states from 
among the total individuals in each state.  Now, the number of potential in-migrants into Illinois 
                                                 
29
 US Census Bureau provides each state’s age-cohort structure until 2030 in its website. But now we do not use this 
estimation. 
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and their distribution across ages are known.  Next, the estimation results summarized in table 
2.4 and figure 2.1 are used to compute the expected number of domestic in-migrants into Illinois 
per age-cohort in the future. Similar methods are used to estimate number of international in-
migrants and out-migrants30 per age-cohort for every year in the future.  Table 2.11 shows the 
example of calibration of the population structure related to migration status.  The calibration 
procedure regarding the population of migrants is largely consistent with the actual population 
structure of ACS (2007).  
 Figure 2.5 presents the growth rate of the retirees in the two models.  Both of them show 
quite similar movements; it is possible to confirm again that the ageing phenomenon of Illinois 
will accelerate until the mid 2020s and then decelerate substantially. 
 In addition, it is assumed that a domestic in-migrant’s status lasts only one year: that is, 
the heterogeneity across domestic in-migrants and native residents will disappear in one year as 
the in-migrant morphs into the characteristics of the residents.  However, the characteristics as an 
international in-migrant are not assumed to disappear permanently.  
 The returns to education parameter value should be given to natives, domestic in-
migrants and international in-migrants consistently with the result of section 2.  Since the 
interpretation of the empirical results and the general procedure of calibrating parameters of 
return to education (Bq) and degree of human capital transmission ( ,hc qpi ) and initial human 
capital distribution are the same as that of prior section, the details of calibration procedure will 
not be repeated here.  Also see the appendix for the assumptions and procedure for estimating the 
initial human capital stock distribution.  Tables 2.12 and 2.13 show the parameter values 
                                                 
30
 For computing the number of out-migrants, we used the results of the binary response model, which included the 
dummy variables representing the age-cohort groups as its covariates.     
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assigned in the 2nd model dealing with the heterogeneity of migration status.  Note that the labor 
market participation rate (vq) is set to be equal to 0.6472,31 regardless of migration status. 
 
2.5 Computational results 
2.5.1 Result from the 1st model: Model with heterogeneity due to races 
The model projects that per-capita output of Illinois in 2050 will be 48.9% larger than that in 
2001.  The growth rate of per-capita output will continue to decrease until mid 2020s and then 
will recover partially (figure 2.6).  As the first chapter revealed, the improvement of the human 
capital stock resulting from investment in education mitigates the negative effect of an ageing 
population.  Since the new model incorporates the heterogeneity of different races, it is possible 
to explore the development of human capital stock of each race.  Table 2.14 shows average 
human capital stock per worker (excluding non-participants in labor market) from 2001 to 2050.  
Black’s human capital stock grows at 83.57% between 2001 and 2050.  Even though the Black’s 
growth rate is higher than the other races, their human capital stock level will be still lower than 
the other races in 2050.  The reason why Black’s human capital stock does not catch up with the 
other races’ is because their educational investment lags behind those of other races for most of 
the years.  Figure 2.7 shows the changes of average investment in education, which is denoted as 
percentage of endowment time, of each race over time.  
 Development of average welfare including non-participants in the labor market is 
presented in figure 2.8.  As per-capita output increases, each individual’s welfare also improves.  
However, the results imply that the gaps between races will not be narrowed in the future even 
though Black’s return to education is much higher than White’s.  This is mainly because the 
educational investment of Whites will continue to be much more than those of the other races in 
                                                 
31
 This is actual average value of all civilians during 2003-2008. Please see table 2.10. 
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the future.  In the model, it is certain that differences of educational investment will result in 
gaps of human capital stock levels and subsequently individual incomes.   
 Next, the following experiments are intended to explore some policy implications.  First, 
as noted in the previous section focusing on calibration measures, Black’s participation rate in 
working is relatively low, compared to the other races, by about 4% points.  This is because the 
unemployment rate for Blacks is substantially higher, although there is no significant difference 
of participation rate in labor force between races (table 2.15).  
 Since the major economic problem during the ageing era (the period in which the 
percentage of the population over 65 will approach 20%) will stem from the deficiency of 
workers, one of the easiest policy measures is to try to increase the participation rates of Blacks 
in the workforce to the level of the other races by absorbing the unemployed Blacks (we can 
refer to this as “employment policy” in this chapter).  For example, the government could 
subsidize the industry if it employs an unemployed Black person or provide incentives to Blacks 
to enhance their skills in anticipation of increasing the probability of their being employed.  We 
will present the simulation result when we increase Black participation rate by 4 percentage 
points (to 65.49% in the model).  
 Secondly, the other policy alternative is to improve the degree of human capital 
transmission between generations of Blacks.  As table 2.9 reveals, the degree of efficiency of 
inter-generational human capital transmission of Black has been calibrated to be substantially 
lower in the model compared to the other races; policy makers could try to improve this 
efficiency.   For instance, a problem could be devised to try to lower the high school dropout 
rates of young black people so that older generation’s accumulated human capital stock could be 
more effectively transmitted to young generations of black people.  The opportunity presented 
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here may be amplified by the fact that the state of Illinois state ranked32 4th in black high school 
students’ dropout rate for the academic year 2003-2004 (table 2.16).  The learning ability 
acquired in the earlier life-time from either formal or non-formal institutions could affect 
seriously the learning ability in the later time.  So improvement of the educational environment 
for young Blacks will help to increase the efficiency of the human capital transmission between 
the generations of Blacks through either learning-by-doing or training at the workplace, 
improving the average human capital stock level of Blacks eventually. 
 The simulation results will be derived by setting the parameter of human capital 
transmission for Blacks to be equal to the average of the other races (that is, hcpi =1.0672).  The 
simulation result implies that educational policy, that targets the upgrading of the transmission 
channel of human capital stock from old generation to young generation of black people, is 
preferable to the employment policy in a long-term.  In the beginning year when each policy is 
implemented, the employment policy increases per-capita output by 0.76% while the educational 
policy raises it by 0.01%.  However, in 2050, employment policy increases per-capita output by 
0.62% while educational policy could increase it by 2.37% (figure 2.9).  The accelerated long-
term positive effects of educational policy stem mainly from the fact that the benefit of the 
enhanced education system is accumulated generation by generation, creating a temporal 
synergistic effect.  On the contrary, the employment policy effect is only marginally accumulated 
into succeeding generations.  
 Further, educational policy is more beneficial in terms of average social welfare than 
employment policy.  In 2050, average social welfare is increase by 2.0% under educational 
policy, compared to the baseline economy.  However, in the same year, average social welfare 
                                                 
32
 Michigan: 11.9%, Washington: 11.2%, Louisiana: 11.1%. 
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decreases by 1.0% under employment policy, compared to the baseline economy.  This is 
because a simple policy of employment expansion without consideration of improvement in 
productivity lowers the worker’s wage rate due to competition; it also increases the social 
security tax due to increase of recipients of retirement pension instead. 
 
2.5.2 Result from the 2nd model: Model with heterogeneity due to migration status 
Computational results show that per-capita output will increase by 46.4% from 2001 to 2050.  
Growth of per-capita output will decrease until the mid 2020s and then will recover thereafter 
(figure 2.10).  
 The computational results imply that the gaps of human capital levels between continuing 
residents (“native”) and international immigrants will be maintained in the future.33  International 
immigrants’ human capital level is 58.0% smaller in 2001 and will be still 46.4% smaller than 
natives in 2050 (figure 2.11). 
    Policy makers could consider two alternative policies because there are significant 
productivity gaps between migration statuses.  Those policies are called “international 
immigration restriction” and “educational transfer” policy in this chapter.  First, international 
immigration restriction policy strengthens the criteria for employment of international 
immigrants; therefore, natives’ unemployment rate will decrease.  This policy stems from the 
belief in the crowding out notion, that immigrants displace native residents in the job market.  In 
the simulation, newly immigrated international individuals’ labor market participation rate is set 
to be zero.  Instead, these international individuals are replaced with native individuals who have 
been unemployed but have higher productivity than international immigrants.  Secondly, we 
                                                 
33
 Due to restrictive assumption of this model, that is domestic immigrants will turn to natives in one year after 
he/she immigrated into Illinois, comparison between domestic immigrants and native residents is meaningless. 
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experiment with the educational transfer policy regime, which was explored in the previous 
chapter.  When the government operates the educational transfer system, it levies educational tax 
on household’s income and reimburse proportionally to his/her opportunity cost stemming from 
time spent on educational investment. In our experiment, the government’s educational transfer 
policy targets the individuals with relatively low productivity-international immigrants.  We set 
the reimbursement rate is .20 (say).  So we assume government reimburses part of opportunity 
cost of schooling investment of only international immigrant workers.   
 This educational transfer policy for international immigrants should be supported by the 
following data.  According to the statistics published in 2003 by the Urban Institute, 18% of all 
foreign-born workers attained less than 9th grade; on the contrary, only 1% of native workers 
attained less than 9th grade.  Even in a same group of low-wage workers, defined as workers 
earning less than 200 percent of state minimum wage, the gaps of formal schooling between the 
international immigrant and native workers are obvious: 28% foreign-born workers finished less 
than 9th grade while only 2% of native workers attained less than 9th grade.  Also, 46% of all 
foreign-born workers are “limited English proficient”.  Without fiscal incentives, these lacks of 
formal schooling and English proficiency would continue to play as a barrier to international 
immigrant workers’ participation in postsecondary schooling with sacrificing their current 
income for their future human capital.   
 For simulation, we assume that government’s social security system and educational 
transfer system are operated independently from each other. Also we assume that the 
government’s budget is balanced every period.  Therefore, the budget constraint corresponding 
to the educational transfer system is like following while the constraint of social security system 
is same as (2.23):  
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where superscript int denotes international immigrants.  
Computational results show that educational policy focused on improving human capital 
of low-productive workers is preferable in terms of improving aggregate productivity to the 
immigration restriction policy that restricts the international immigrants’ employment.  When 
governments restricts newly arrived international immigrants’ employment even completely and 
replaces those workers with relatively high productive native residents, the positive effects on 
per-capita output is close to constant in term of deviation from baseline economy.  However, if 
the government tries to improve international immigrant worker’s productivity in a way that the 
policy encourages immigrant people to spend more time in education, the effect on per-capita 
output will accumulate and grow gradually (figure 2.12).   
 This is mainly because aggregate human capital stock is more positively affected by 
educational policy (table 2.17).  In 2050, aggregate human capital stock under educational 
transfer policy regime is 4.27% higher than baseline economy where no government policy is 
involved.  On the contrary, human capital under restrictive immigration policy is barely (0.66%) 
higher than the baseline economy.  It should be noted that educational transfer policy, which is 
focused on improving international immigrants’ human capital stock, also improves the human 
capital stock of native workers by 4.16% while the restrictive immigration policy does not 
improve the natives.  This could be interpreted that there exist the positive spillover effect 
between native and international immigrant’s human capital stock. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
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 In this chapter, we have developed two-sector OLG model with intra-generational 
heterogeneity over individual’s race and migration status.  Also we examined the impact of 
population ageing on the regional economy; and checked the effect of government’s policy 
measures on the economy.  For this, we set up the empirical model to draw the implication for 
heterogeneity over race and migration status.  We found out that there are significant gaps of 
return to education between races and migration status in Illinois: Return to education was larger 
in order of black > white > others; and domestic in-migrant > out-migrants > natives > 
international immigrants.  However, there are overall noteworthy negative effects of being black 
or international immigrants on individual’s earnings.  Also, we revealed with empirical data that 
young and low-income residents outside Illinois are more probable to in-migrate into Illinois; 
and old and high-income residents inside Illinois are more probable to out-migrate from Illinois. 
 Using two-sector OLG model, we demonstrated growth of Illinois economy will be 
decelerated substantially until mid 2020’s due to population ageing and then partially recover.  
We drew some implications for policy makers.  First, policy that makes low productive people to 
get better education is preferable to the policy that encourages the firms to employ the low 
productive people, in terms of long-run effectiveness on per-capita income and social welfare.  
Secondly, positive effects of policy that restricts employment of the international immigrants are 
very limited in terms of per-capita income, welfare and aggregate productivity.  On the contrary, 
tax and transfer policy that induces international in-migrants to invest more in their education 
works well.  Even though the regime’s direct beneficiary is an international immigrant, the 
native’s human capital stock also improves significantly because of positive spillover effect.  
 Overall, with the limited fiscal budget constraint, government policies should be focused 
on facilitating the growth of the human capitals of the disadvantaged groups (such as Blacks and 
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international immigrants in this chapter) to maintain the sustainable growth in the future, taking 
the fact into considerations that today’s skilled workforce are rapidly approaching to retirement 
age.  
 Now, two comments on further research topics will be presented. First, the subject this 
chapter explored could be examined further by adopting the approaches of Aiyagari (1994) and 
Huggett (1996).  In this chapter, even though we incorporated the heterogeneity between race 
and migration status, the heterogeneity inside a same race and same migration status group was 
not captured in our model.  Therefore, the further study could assume that the individuals are 
exposed to the uninsured idiosyncratic productivity shock over their lifetime.  The transition 
specification of risks including Markov chain of the shocks could be calibrated from the empirics 
including the results in section 2.  This kind of studies would present more detailed and robust 
picture of transition path of economic variables such as income distribution and welfares. 
 Secondly, as Yoon (2006) revealed, the heterogeneity of consumption bundles among 
different age-cohort groups as an empirical fact, our one-composite-commodity general 
equilibrium model should be extended to trace the interactions between the change of 
demographics and development of consumption structure and growth of the economy.  As a 
starting point, Foellmi (2005)’s growth model could be adopted into our OLG framework. 
Foellmi (2005) accepted the non-homothetic hierarchic preferences, whose property eventually 
enables individual’s consumption composition exhibits different pattern according to 
development of individual’s income level.  In his paper, the general equilibrium features the 
continuous structural change along the long-run growth path and the economy converges to 
constant growth rate.   
 
 67 
Figures and Tables 
.
02
.
02
5
.
03
.
03
5
.
04
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y
20 40 60 80 100
Age
Domestic International
 
Figure 2.1: Expected probability of selecting move into IL from ROUS  
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Figure 2.2: Expected probability of selecting moving out of IL to ROUS  
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Figure 2.3: Expected probability of selecting moving out of IL to ROUS (alternative) 
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Figure 2.4: Composition of races of Illinois in the model 
 
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
2002 2006 2010 2014 2018 2022 2026 2030 2034 2038 2042 2046 2050
Model focused on migration (2nd mdoel)
Model foucused on races (1st model)
(%)
 
Figure 2.5: Growth rate of retired age group 
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Figure 2.6: Projection on per-capita output of Illinois and its growth rate 
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Figure 2.7: Educational investment per worker  
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Figure 2.8: Average welfare of each race 
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Figure 2.9: Effects on per-capita output of two policy measures 
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Figure 2.10: Per-capita output and its growth rate 
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Figure 2.11: Average human capital stock per worker 
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 Figure 2.12: Deviation of per-capita output from baseline economy (%)  
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Table 2.1: Data description: ACS 2007  
U. S Illinois 
 Average Std. Dev Min Max Average Std. Dev Min Max 
Age 39.0 23.2 0 95 38.6 23.1 0 93 
Log of household 
income 11.1 1.2 0 16.1 11.1 1.2 1.4 16.1 
Obs. 2,994,662 127,458 
Sex Male 48.6%, Female 51.4% Male 48.4%, Female 51.6% 
Race/Ethnicity -White 77.9%, Black 9.9%, Asian 4.3% 
-Hispanic 12.4% 
-White 78.3%, Black 10.7%, Asian 3.7% 
-Hispanic 10.5% 
Student 
- Student 25.4%  
- No student 71.1% 
- NA 3.5% 
- Student 26.5%  
- No student 70.0% 
- NA 3.5% 
Employment 
- Employed 46.7% 
- Unemployed 2.9% 
- Not in labor force 29.8% 
- NA 20.5%  
- Employed 47.6% 
- Unemployed 3.4% 
- Not in labor force 28.0% 
- NA 21.0% 
Source: Integrated Public Use Micro-data Series, Minnesota Population Center, University of Minnesota 
 
Table 2.2: Tabulation between Census’ educational attainment and schooling years 
Census’ educational attainment categories Schooling years 
No school completed 1.30 
Nursery school-4th grade 3.92 
5th-6th grade 6.22 
7th-8th grade 7.84 
9th grade 9.08 
10th grade 9.90 
11th grade 10.81 
12th grade, no diploma 11.38 
High school graduate, or GED 12.00 
Some college, less than 1 year 13.35 
One or more years of college but no degree 13.87 
Associate degree 14.29 
Bachelor's degree 16.04 
Master's degree 17.57 
Professional degree* 18.57 
Doctorate degree* 20.57 
                      Note: School years of professional degree = school years of master’s degree + 1 
                                School years of doctorate degree = school years of master’s degree + 3   
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Table 2.3.1: Mincerian regression results: different migration status  
 I. Natives in IL 
II. Domestic 
immigrants  
to IL 
III. Inter’l 
immigrants 
to IL 
Current 
residents in IL 
(I+II+III) 
Emigrants from 
IL 
constant 
4.196 
(0.039) 
2.195 
(0.324) 
4.270 
(0.751) 
4.172 
(0.039) 
2.875 
(0.255) 
age 
0.191 
(0.002) 
0.250 
(0.016) 
0.168 
(0.041) 
0.192 
(0.002) 
0.233 
(0.013) 
age  
-0.002 
(0.000) 
-0.003 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
(0.000) 
schooling  
year 
0.129 
(0.002) 
0.190 
(0.014) 
0.109 
(0.030) 
0.130 
(0.002) 
0.159 
(0.012) 
d _int’l    
-0.485 
(0.065)  
d_dom    
-0.121 
(0.031)  
obs. 66,104 1,262 280 67,646 1,626 
R2 0.2587 0.3296 0.1990 0.2611 0.3484 
Note: standard errors are denoted inside the parenthesis. 
 
Table 2.3.2: Mincerian regression results: different races  
 I. White II. Black III. Others 
Current 
residents in IL 
(I+II+III) 
constant 
4.114 
(0.044) 
3.264 
(0.146) 
4.847    
(0.113) 
4.176 
 (0.039) 
age 
0.191 
(0.002) 
0.195 
(0.006) 
0.186    
(0.005) 
0.193    
(0.002) 
age  
-0.002 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
(0.000) 
-0.002    
(0.000) 
-0.002    
(0.000) 
schooling  
year 
0.137 
(0.002) 
0.166 
(0.007) 
0.091     
(0.003) 
0.129    
(0.002) 
d _black    
-0.266    
(0.015) 
d_others    
0.065    
(0.014) 
obs. 54,705 5,946 6,995 67,646 
R2 0.2591 0.2763 0.2673 0.2644 
              Note: standard errors are denoted inside the parenthesis. 
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Table 2.4: Result of binary logit regression: ROUS → Illinois  
 
Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
Constant 
-3.2992 
(0.2016) 
Age 
-0.0083 
(0.0015) 
Log of household income 
-0.0604 
(0.0125) 
Schooling year 
0.0612 
(0.0084) 
d_int’l 
0.1186 
(0.0567) 
  
Obs. 61,463 
R2 0.0064 
                  Note: standard errors are denoted inside the parenthesis. 
 
Table 2.5: Result of binary logit regression: IL → ROUS  
 
Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
Constant 
-3.7680 
   (0.2492) 
Age 
-0.0164      
(0.0069) 
Age  
0.0002    
(0.0001) 
log(household income)  0.0841    (0.0115) 
schooling year 
0.1189    
(0.0099) 
  
Obs. 11,562 
R2 0.0185 
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Table 2.6: Result of binary logit regression with the dummy variables: IL → ROUS 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
 Constant -4.1589 
 (0.2034) 
 d_age3040 -0.1327 
 (0.0653) 
 d_age4050 -0.2071 
 (0.0799) 
 d_age5060 -0.1124 
 (0.0874) 
 d_age6070 0.6488 
 (0.0997) 
 d_age7080 0.3392 
 (0.1292) 
 d_age80 -0.4997 
 (0.1612) 
 log(household income) 0.0954 
 (0.0114) 
 schooling year 0.1169 
 (0.0098) 
  
 Obs. 11,562 
 R2 0.0251 
  Note: d_age3040 represents the group of people who are ≥ 30 and < 40; and  
  d_age80 represents the people who are ≥ 80. 
 
Table 2.7: Population of Illinois by Race 
 2000 2010 2020 2030 
White 9,142,005 (73.48)         9,310,030 (70.11)         9,553,780 (66.73)         9,671,937 (63.89) 
Black    1,880,101 (15.11)         1,981,006 (14.92)         2,094,687 (14.63)         2,150,187 (14.20) 
Asian       424,291            628,663            872,341         1,094,499 
Other        994,449 
(11.40) 
        1,359,392 (14.97)         1,795,679 (18.64)         2,222,226 (21.91) 
All   12,440,846 (100.0)       13,279,091 (100.0)       14,316,487 (100.0)       15,138,849 (100.0) 
Note: Asian and other in this table is categorized into same “Others” group in the model. 
Source: http://www.ildceo.net/dceo/Bureaus/Facts_Figures/Population_Projections/ 
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Table 2.8: Parameter value of B: efficiency of human capital accumulation 
 
Coefficient of schooling 
year Exp (Coef.) Value assignment to B 
White 0.137 1.1468 0.2803 
Black 0.166 1.1806 0.2886 
Others 0.091 1.0953 0.2678 
Weighted Average   0.2800 
 
Table 2.9: Parameter value of hcpi : efficiency of human capital transmission 
 
Coefficient multiplied 
by dummy variable Value assignment to 
hcpi  
White 0 1.0335 
Black -0.2661 0.7585 
Others 0.0652 1.1009 
Weighted Average  1.0000 
 
Table 2.10: Employment status by races of US  
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Average 
White 168,765 170,045 171,756 173,408 175,210 176,456 172,607 
Black 23,304 23,643 24,036 24,442 24,845 25,168 24,240 
Population: A 
(Civilian,  
age≥20) Others 13,003 13,446 13,893 14,287 14,830 15,089 14,091 
White 114,572 115,156 116,348 117,826 119,139 119,991 117,172 
Black 15,755 15,876 16,210 16,443 16,695 16,953 16,322 Labor force: B 
Others 9,012 9,255 9,599 9,878 10,278 10,485 9,751 
White 5,401 4,957 4,504 4,208 4,338 5,563 4,829 
Black 1,532 1,488 1,433 1,296 1,210 1,543 1,417 
Unemployed 
person: C 
Others 590 496 468 378 429 533 482 
White 64.69 64.81 65.12 65.52 65.52 64.85 65.09 
Black 61.03 60.86 61.48 61.97 62.33 61.23 61.49 (B-C) / A (%) 
Others 64.77 65.14 65.72 66.49 66.41 65.96 65.78 
Source: Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics 
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Table 2.11: Ratio of migrants: Calibration vs. Survey data 
 
Ratio of residents who 
migrated domestically 
into IL for one year 
Ratio of residents who 
migrated internationally 
into IL for one year 
Ratio of residents who 
migrated out of IL for 
one year 
Calibration 
in case of 2007 
1.66% 0.47% 2.24% 
ACS 2007 1.58% 0.43% 2.01% 
    Note: Based on the people who age >= 20. 
 
Table 2.12: Parameter value of B: efficiency of human capital accumulation 
 
Coefficient of schooling 
year Exp (Coef.) Value assignment to B 
Continual residents 0.129 1.1377 0.2796 
Domestic immigrants 0.190 1.2092 0.2972 
International immigrants 0.109 1.1152 0.2741 
 
Table 2.13: Parameter value of hcpi : efficiency of human capital transmission 
 
Coefficient multiplied 
by dummy variable Value assignment to 
hcpi  
Continual residents 0 1.0087 
Domestic immigrants -0.121 0.8867 
International immigrants -0.485 0.5195 
 
Table 2.14: Average human capital stock per worker  
 2001 (A) 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 (B) B/A 
Black 1.2819 1.5690 1.8029 2.0060 2.1904 2.3532 1.8357 
White 1.8444 2.0515 2.2389 2.4284 2.6090 2.7792 1.5068 
Others 1.8323 1.9696 2.1228 2.3086 2.5028 2.6828 1.4642 
Total 1.7624 1.9725 2.1600 2.3491 2.5318 2.7026 1.5335 
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Table 2.15: Employment statistics of US in 2007 
 White Black Asian Total 
Participation rate in 
labor force (age>=16) 66.4% 63.7% 66.5% 66.0% 
Unemployment rate 
(age>=16) 4.1% 8.3% 3.2% 4.6% 
 
Table 2.16: Public high school event dropout rates by race and ethnicity during 2003-04 
 White Black Hispanic Asian American Indian Total 
Illinois 3.5% 9.6% 8.2% 2.5% 5.0% 5.3% 
U S 2.9% 6.4% 5.9% 2.5% 7.2% 3.9% 
Note: 1. Asian includes Pacific Islander and American Indian includes Alaska native. 
          2. The event dropout rate estimates the percentage of both private and public high school students who left 
high school between the beginning of one school year and the beginning of the next without earning a high school 
diploma or its equivalent (e.g., a GED). 
Source: Digest of Education Statistics 2007, Institute of Education Sciences, US Department of Education 
 
Table 2.17: Comparison of human capital stock of each group in 2050 
 
Baseline 
economy 
(A) 
Under restrictive 
immigration policy 
(B) 
Under educational 
transfer policy  
(C) 
(B-A)/A (C-A)/A 
  Whole workers 2.7599 2.7782 2.8778 0.66% 4.27% 
   Native workers 2.7842 2.7827 2.9000 -0.05% 4.16% 
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Chapter 3 
 
Inter-Regional Endogenous Growth under the Impacts of Demographic Changes 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter attempts to project the economic paths for the individual Midwest states 
(Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio and Wisconsin, as well as the Rest of the US) in the 
future when the population ageing becomes more pronounced.  To accomplish this task, a 
dynamic general equilibrium model is developed so that it could incorporate the inter-
regional transactions and endogenous growth mechanisms within the framework of an 
overlapping generations (OLG) model.   
 There has been expanding literature that has adopted OLG models to explore the 
issues of demographic change.  In particular, the papers that used the OLG model and the 
endogenous growth mechanism showed that the negative impact of population ageing 
could be mitigated through the revelation of educational motive on the part of workers 
since educational investment in developing workers’ human capital could improve the 
overall productivity in the corresponding economy and thus significantly attenuate the 
shortage of labor force.  The literature includes the work of Sadahiro and Shimasawa 
(2002) and Ludwig et al. (2007).  Although those two papers accepted different human 
capital technology under different scenarios of age-population projection, they found out 
that the individual’s educational motive substantially adjusts the effect of population 
ageing.  However, their papers did not pay attention to the interconnections between the 
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regions, assuming implicitly that all transactions including exchanging intermediate 
inputs and consumption and investment goods are done in single economy.  However, 
when multiple economies are interconnected with each other, then the different scale of 
demographic changes in one region should bring about the different flows of transactions 
between the regions.  It is important to develop a dynamic model that could recognize the 
interconnections between the regions.   
 Fougere et al. (2004) showed the effect of population ageing in Canada under 
some alternative scenarios.  In this context, they presented different demographic 
scenarios depending on the different number of immigrants and immigration destinations.  
The main contribution of this paper is to introduce an inter-regional OLG framework to 
capture the interactions of six regions of Canada.  For this, they assumed that the regional 
goods are imperfect substitutes each other; and each region’s purchase of consumption 
and investment goods from the six regions are ruled by a constant elasticity substitution 
(CES) function.  They assumed no transactions of intermediate goods between the 
regions; and the productivity of each age-cohort was exogenously given. 
 A multi-regional social accounting matrix (SAM) records all the transactions 
between the regions in a certain fiscal year.  This valuable source could be useful to 
calibrating the parameters in the inter-regional model, especially related to the regional 
demand function for the goods produced in other regions.  There are not many papers that 
use a SAM in the process of calibrating a dynamic general equilibrium model.  Among 
them, Kehoe et al. (1995) and Kehoe (1996) could be regarded as a starting point for 
using SAM in general equilibrium models.  Kehoe et al. (1995) and Kehoe (1996) 
attempted to use social accounting matrices (SAMs) in muti-sectoral general equilibrium 
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models.  Those papers used the transaction data of Spanish (national-level) SAM to 
calibrate the parameter in consumption, investment and production function.  Adopting 
the disaggregated model specification, where 12 production sectors, 9 consumption goods 
and 3 factors of production, those papers simulated the Spanish economy and presented 
the impacts of Spain’s integration into the European Community.   
 This chapter is organized as follows.  In section 2, the model description will be 
presented.  In section 3, the calibration procedure will be described, focusing on the 
regional production, consumption and investment demand function, by using an 
aggregated six-regional Midwest SAM for year 2007 that was compiled by the Regional 
Economics Applications Laboratory (REAL) at the University of Illinois at the Urbana-
Champaign (UIUC).  In section 4, computational results including steady-state results 
and dynamic results will be presented.  In the final section, conclusions will be drawn and 
suggestions for further research will be briefly discussed. 
 
3.2 Model description 
 
The model represents the US economy through the specification of 6 regions- Illinois 
(IL=1), Indiana (IN=2), Michigan (MI=3), Ohio (OH=4), Wisconsin (WI=5) and the rest 
of US (ROUS=6).  The economy is closed to the rest of the world; thus, there are no 
foreign imports or exports in the model.  There are two types of economic agents in each 
region: a representative firm and households.  Each year, there are 65 overlapped 
generations in the household sector.  Also there is a federal government to operate a 
social security system in each region.  The economy produces physical goods as well as 
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human capital.  Physical goods are tradable across regions; and the firm can purchase 
intermediate goods from each region.  Also, consumers and investors purchase goods 
from all the regions for consumption and investment purposes respectively.   
 
3.2.1 Production 
Regional production functions specify intermediate input requirements of both factors, 
such as labor and capital, and other regional goods.  Following Kehoe (1996), a 
requirement of fixed input per unit production is assumed for a composite input of 
regional goods as well as for value added.  Factor input requirements are represented by 
Cobb-Douglas value-added functions.  Defining 
,j tY  as the gross output in region j  at 
period t , the general form of production technology is as follows: 
, 1 , 1 6 , 6 , ,min( / ,......, / , / )j t j t j j t j j t VA jY x z x z VA z=       (3.1) 
where ijz  is the amount of intermediate good produced in region i , required to produce 
one unit  in region j , 
,VA jz  is the fixed value-added requirement per unit production in the 
region j , ijx  is the intermediate input of regional good produced in region i ; and ,j tVA  is 
the value added.  Value added technology is assumed to take a Cobb-Douglas form: 
1
, , ,
j jd d
j t j j t j tVA A K L
α α−
=          (3.2) 
 while jA  is a parameter of total factor productivity (TFP), djK  is a demand for physical 
capital stock, djL  is a demand for effective labor for the value added and jα  is a 
parameter of capital income share.  We assume that labor is immobile.  Since producers 
minimize cost, they never waste their inputs.  Thus, 
1
, 1 , 1 2 , 2 , , ,/ / .... /j j
d d
j t j t j j t j j j t j t VA jY x z x z A K L z
α α−
= = = =  holds. 
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 The firm’s optimization problem is to solve: 
 Max 
6
, , , , , , , , ,
1
d d
j t j t j t j t j t j t j t i t ij t
i
p Y w L rr K p xpi
=
= − − −∑                                   (3.3) 
where rr  is a rental return of physical capital belonging to investors, w  is a wage rate for 
one effective labor unit.  This problem leads to the following first order conditions: 
,
1
6
,
, , , ,
1,
j
j t
d
j j j t
j t j t i t i jd
iVA j
A K
rr p p z
z L
α
α
−
=
   
 = −     
∑        (3.4) 
6
,
, , , ,
1, ,
(1 ) jdj j j t
j t j t i t i jd
iVA j j t
A K
w p p z
z L
α
α
=
 
−  
= −       
∑       (3.5) 
where p  is output price.  These conditions reveal that the marginal product of capital and 
labor should be depreciated by the cost of buying intermediate goods which complement 
the labor or capital input.  That is, the rental return and wage rate is positively correlated 
with the terms of trade.  If the output price in region j  becomes relatively higher than the 
other regions, then this relative increase should be reflected by factor prices.  Also, 
conditions (3.4) and (3.5) imply that firms earn zero profit in every region at every period 
since the market is assumed to be perfectly competitive. 
 
3.2.2 Consumption 
In each region at every period, households are represented by 65 overlapping generations.  
Each individual is assumed to live 65 periods: each individual is born and enters the labor 
market at age 1 (real age 20), works until age 45; and lives until age 65 (real age 84).  
 A household’s inter-temporal optimization problem consists of choosing a 
sequence of consumption and educational investment share over the life-time in order to 
maximize life-time utility subject to life-time wealth.  The following formulation is a 
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current period preference of a representative household of generation g  in region j  at 
period t : 
1 1
, , , ,
, , , ,
( , )
1
j g t j g t
j g t j g t
c e
u c e
γ γθ
γ
− −+
=
−
 1γ > , 0 1θ< <      (3.6) 
where c  denotes a consumption bundle, which is composed of the final goods produced 
in each region; and e is a educational investment share of individual’s time endowment 
(=1) with γ  determining the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution and θ  being a 
parameter representing the degree of educational investment motive.  Thus, life-time 
utility of a representative individual born at time t  in the region j  is as follows: 
1
1
, , 1
145 45
, , 11
, , 1 , , 1
1 1
( , )
1
g j g t gj g t gg
t j g t g j g t g
g g
c e
U u c e
γ γθβ β
γ
−
− + −
−
+ −
−
+ − + −
= =
 +
 = =
 −
 
∑ ∑     (3.7) 
where β  denotes the subjective discount factor. 
The individual who was born in the region j  at time t  has a following life-time budget 
constraint: 
2 265 45
, , 1 , , 1 , 1 , , 1 , 1 , , 1
1 1, ,
1 1 (1 ) (1 )
1 1
t g t g
c p
j g t g j g t g j t g j g t g j t g j g t g
g gk t k tj k j k
p c h w e
r r
τ
+ − + −
+ − + − + − + − + − + −
= == =
      
= − −            + +      
∑ ∑∏ ∏    
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, , 1
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1
1
t g
j g t g
g k t j k
pen
r
+ −
+ −
= =
  
+     +  
∑ ∏     (3.8) 
where 
,j tr  denotes the rate of return on capital stock in the region j at time t , , ,cj g tp  is 
consumption price index, 
,
p
j tτ  is a pension tax on earnings in the region j  at time t  and 
, ,j g th  denotes human capital stock of age-cohort g  in the region j  at the time t .  This 
budget constraint means that present value of life-time consumption (i.e., left-hand side 
of the equation 3.8) should be exactly the same as the present value of life-time wealth 
 84 
composed of labor income and pension benefits (i.e., right-hand side of 3.8).  It is 
assumed that there is no unexpected death until the age 65; thus there should not be 
unintended bequests.  Note that the current period budget constraint is as follows: 
, 1, 1 , , , , , , , , , , , , ,(1 ) (1 ) (1 )p cj g t j t j g t j t j t j g t j g t j g t j g ta r a w h e p cτ+ + = + + − − −   (if 45g ≤ ), 
, 1, 1 , , , , , , , , ,(1 ) cj g t j t j g t j g t j g t j g ta r a pen p c+ + = + + −  (if 46g ≥ ). 
           (3.9) 
 Now, the inter-temporal Euler equations are computed from the household’s 
optimization problem (3.7) subject to (3.8) as follows: 
1/
, 1 , ,
, 1, 1 , ,
, 1, 1
(1 ) cj j t j g t
j g t j g tc
j g t
r p
c c
p
γβ +
+ +
+ +
 +
=  
  
        (3.10) 
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j g t
j g t j g tp
j t t j g t
p
e c
w h
γθ
τ
 
=   
− 
 (if 45g ≤ )      (3.11) 
Then, aggregate consumption demand in the region j  at the period t  could be 
characterized as: 
, , , , ,j t j g t j g t
g
C N c=∑          (3.12) 
where 
, ,j g tN  is the number of population belonging to the age-cohort g  in the region j  at 
time t . 
 In the next optimization step, Armington’s (1969) strategy is applied to allocate 
the household’s consumption expenditure across each region’s produced goods.  
Consumers are assumed to consider each region’s goods as imperfect substitutes.  Given 
this assumption, a CES type sub-utility function of households can be developed: 
1
1
, , , , , ,
( )
c
c c jj jc c
j g t i j i j g t
i
c d
σσ συ −
 
=  
 
∑           (3.13) 
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where 
, , ,i j g t
cd  denotes the demand for the final good produced at the region i  by 
individuals of age-cohort g  living at the region j ; and 
,
c
i jυ  is a preference parameter 
determining a consumption distribution across regional goods; and cjσ  determines the 
elasticity of substitution across regional goods at the region j .  Then, by the first order 
condition of household’s optimization problem, the demand for region i product by the 
region j  consumers is specified as follows: 
, , ,
1
1
,
, , ,
,
c
j
i j g t
c
j tc c
i j j g t
i t
p
d c
p
σ
υ
− 
=   
 
        (3.14) 
where 
,i tp  is the output price of goods produced at the region i  at the time t .  The 
consumption price index (
,
c
j tp ) can be computed as a non-linear weighted average of each 
region’s output price: 
1 1
, , ,
c c
j j
c c
j jc c
j t i j i t
i
p p
σ σ
σ συ
− −
− −
=∑          (3.15) 
 
3.2.3 Investment 
After consumption and social security payments, the rest of an individual’s disposable 
income is saved in the form of investment in physical capital for the next period.  The 
aggregate supply of physical capital at the region j  can be defined as follows: 
, , , ,
,
,
j g t j g t
gs
j t I
j t
N a
K
p
=
∑
          (3.16) 
where Ip  denotes the unit price of the investment good and sK  is a aggregate supply of 
physical capital. 
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The law of motion for the physical capital stock is as follows: 
, 1 , ,(1 )s k sj t j t j tK Inv Kδ+ = + −         (3.17) 
where kδ  denotes the depreciation rate of physical capital; and 
,j tInv  represents the 
aggregate investment bundle in the region j .  Investment activity is supposed to be inter-
regional, implying that the investment bundle in the region j  (
,j tInv ), which was 
purchased in region j  for the investment purpose, is composed of each region’s produced 
good.  The investment bundle (
,j tInv ) is formed as a CES function that combines the 
goods from the six different regions as follows: 
1
1
, , , ,
( )
II I jj jI I
j t i j i j t
i
Inv d
σσ συ −
 
=  
 
∑         (3.18) 
where 
, ,
I
i j td  is the quantity of goods produced in region i , that is demanded by the 
investor34 of region j ; 
,
I
i jυ  is the preference parameter determining a regional distribution 
of investment goods and Ijσ  determines the elasticity of substitution across the regional 
goods.  Then, an investor chooses the optimal portfolio of regional goods according to the 
following equation: 
, ,
1
1
,
, ,
,
I
j
i j t
I
j tI I
i j j t
i t
p
d Inv
p
σ
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        (3.19) 
Now, 
,
I
j tp  can be computed as a non-linear weighted average of each region’s output 
price: 
                                                 
34
 There is no investor in this model explicitly. However, for the purpose of interpretation of model 
specification, an investor could be understood as a group of individuals in each region; and an investor is 
supposed to decide the composition of portfolio of the aggregate investment in his/her region. 
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 The rate of return from investment in physical capital should be composed of 
rental return and a capital gain as follows: 
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where 
,j tR  denotes the (net) rate of return from the investment in physical capital. There 
are no financial assets in this economy, so this rate of return will serve as a bench mark 
interest rate; thus 
, ,
1 1j t j tr R+ = +  for all j .  
 
3.2.4 Social security 
The federal government operates a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) style pension system.  Under 
the PAYG system, the government levies a social security tax ( pτ ) on labor income and 
transfers the pension benefit to the retirees.  There is neither public debt nor other forms 
of taxation from the governments.  The pension benefit ( pen ) is assumed to be a fraction 
of average life-time labor income and this fraction rate (ξ ) is identical across the regions.  
The pension benefit is fixed according to the following: 
45
, 46, , , ( ) , ( ) , , ( )
1
(1 )j G t j g t G g j t G g j g t G g
g
pen e w hξ≥ − − − − − −
=
= −∑      (3.22) 
The social security tax is endogenously determined so that the federal government’s 
pension system is assumed to be balanced every period as follows:  
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∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ .    (3.23) 
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3.2.5 Human capital 
The human capital technology is governed by the following specification proposed by 
Sadahiro and Shimasawa (2002): 
1
, 1, 1 , , , , , , ,(1 ) ( ) ( )j g t h j g t j t j g t j g th h B mk h eφ φδ −+ + = − +       (3.24) 
where tk is the physical capital/labor ratio while B is the parameter for the accumulation 
efficiency of human capital, m is the portion of physical capital stock used for producing 
the human capital stock, hδ  is the parameter of depreciation rate of human capital stock 
and φ  is the parameter of the elasticity of human capital formation function.   
 Human capital is transmitted between generations according the following rule: 
45 45
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where hcpi  is the parameter of human capital transmission factor.  This parameter can be 
interpreted as the degree of quality or efficiency to pass the available stock of knowledge 
from generation to generation.  If a society can provide the individual a successful 
educational environment (either formally or in-formally) in childhood and youth so that 
the individual earns the cognitive ability and creativeness well in these period, this 
parameter value should be high since the human ability acquired early will make post-
secondary learning easier.    
 The aggregate human capital stock of region j at time t  is defined using (3.26); 
and the aggregate supply of labor can be computed using (3.27): 
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3.2.6 Competitive equilibrium 
A competitive equilibrium of the economy is defined as a dynamic and spatial sequence 
of regional disaggregate variables {
, , , , , ,
, ,j g t j g t j g tc e a } , ,j g t ; regional aggregate variables 
{
, , , , , ,
, , , , ,
s s d d
j t j t j t j t j t j tC K L K L Inv } ,j t ; regional demand variables { , , ,ci j g td } , , ,i j g t  and { , ,ii j td } , ,i j t ; 
regional intermediate demand variable {
,ij tx } , ,i j t ; regional output price and factor prices 
{
, , ,
, ,j t j t j tp rr w } ,j t ; the interest rate { ,j tr } ,j t ; and the regional pension contribution rate 
{ ptτ } t  where ,i j =IL, IN, MI, OH, WI and ROUS; g  is the age-cohort from 1 to 65; and 
t  denotes year which satisfy 1) through 4): 
1) Given prices and interest rate, the allocations are feasible for every region at every 
period: 
, , , , , , , , ,
c I
i t ij t j g t i j g t i j t
j j g j
Y x N d d= + +∑ ∑∑ ∑ , , ,s dj t j tL L=  and , ,s dj t j tK K= . 
2) Output prices and factor prices {
, , ,
, ,j t j t j tp rr w } ,j t  satisfy (3.4) and (3.5) for every 
region at every period; and (3.21) holds for every period. 
3) Given prices and the interest rate, disaggregate variables {
, , , , , ,
, ,j g t j g t j g tc e a } , ,j g t  satisfy 
(3.9), (3.10) and (3.11) for every generations for every region at every period.  
4) Given prices and interest rate, the pension contribution rate { ptτ } t  satisfies (3.23) for 
every region at every period. 
 
3.3 Calibration 
 
This section will focus on the estimation of the parameter values in the production, 
consumption and investment functions.  There are very little data available necessary for 
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statistically estimating the inter-regional elasticity of substitution in consumption and 
investment functions described in the previous section.  For example, there are only four 
sets (that is, 1993, 1997, 2002 and 2007) of data from the Commodity Flow Survey 
(CFS).  Also, there are no time-series of SAMs to provide the possibility for estimating 
the price elasticities of consumption and investment across the regions.  However, there 
is some literature that has attempted to estimate the regional import elasticity of 
substitution in the US, focused on individual industries.  For example, Bilgic et al. (2002) 
estimate the elasticity of import substitution for 20 industry groups between 48 states, 
based on the micro-level data of 1993 CFS.  In this chapter, for the regional elasticity of 
substitution, this work is used as a benchmark; thereafter, the preference parameters of 
consumers and investors in each region from the six-regional Midwest-SAM are 
developed.  For the human capital technology, the parameter values are assumed to be 
identical across regions, drawing on those available for the US economy in Sadahiro and 
Shimasawa (2002). 
 
3.3.1 Production function 
Table 3.1 is provides the expenditure quantities across regions for all industries in each 
state derived from input-output table of the Midwest.  Since this chapter does not 
consider sectors of institutions as well as tax and transfer of government and international 
trade, we exclude the products of institution and indirect business taxes as well as exports 
and imports in the table when calibrating the parameters.  Also it should be noted that the 
original values in the IO table are denominated by the consumer price index (CPI) of 
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each corresponding region (see table 3.2 for the regional coverage of CPI).  Thus, each 
number in the cell in the table 3.1 is a unit-free quantity.   
 The parameters determining the quantity of intermediate goods across regions 
(that is, ijz ) could be computed as shares of expenditures from the table 3.1.  The capital 
and labor income shares are also computed from the same table.  Table 3.3 reveals the 
parameter values, which will be assigned to the production function.  
 
3.3.2 Consumption and Investment functions 
The elasticity of substitution in consumption and investment across regional goods is set 
to be 1.103, derived from the result of Bilgic et al. (2002).  This number is the estimated 
elasticity of import substitution of all commodities.  This elasticity is assumed to be 
homogeneous across regions and generations.  Using this parameter value, the preference 
parameter of each region in consumption and investment could be computed with the 
information of consumption and investment shares of each region (table 3.4).  Note that 
the magnitude in this table is also a unit-free quantity.   
 From (3.14), the preference parameter of consumption (
,
c
i jυ ) could be computed as 
follows:  
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where 1/(1 )c cj js σ= −  is nothing but an elasticity of substitution for consumption; and 
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=∑ .  Also, from (3.18), the preference parameter of investment ( ,Ii jυ ) 
can be estimated as: 
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where 1/(1 )I Ij js σ= −  is a elasticity of substitution across regional investment goods; and 
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=∑ .  Table 3.5 shows the calibration results.  
 
3.4 Computational results 
 
3.4.1 Steady-state  
In this section, before presenting the results of the dynamic simulation, the steady state 
simulation results will be briefly summarized.  For this presentation, the age-cohort 
population structure is adopted from the Census Bureau’s estimation for the year 2007.  
Figure 3.1 shows the age-cohort structure that was adopted into the model for the steady 
state simulation.  Note that IL’s total population is normalized to a unit 
(
65
, , 2007
1
1j IL g t
g
N
= =
=
=∑ ).  Table 3.6 reveals that OH has the highest dependency ratio; and IL 
has the lowest.  Figure 3.1 reveals that IL has significantly more people belonging to the 
below-retirement age than OH; but IL has almost same number of people belonging to 
the retirement age as OH.  This could be interpreted as the result of retirement migration 
out of IL35.  For the steady state analysis, this age-cohort population structure is assumed 
to be maintained in the long-term; also, it is assumed that there will be no change in 
prices including output, consumption and investment prices as well as factor prices such 
                                                 
35
 According to the 2008 American Community Survey (ACS) data, Illinois ranked the 2nd state after New 
York in the volume of losing the elderly residents (age 65+) through the out-migration during the previous 
one year.   
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as the rental return and the wage rate.  These assumptions described above would not be 
maintained in the dynamic simulation, the results of which will be presented in the next 
section.  
 The input-output table (table 3.7) could be constructed by using the simulation 
results of the transactions among the six regions.  The IO table, which is one of the 
outcomes of steady state general equilibrium simulation, is very similar to the actual IO 
table presented before: (i) the industries of each state purchases the commodities from the 
industries of the same state in large part;  (ii) the consumers and investors also buy the 
majority of their consumption and investment goods from their own states; (iii) the 
volumes of production are in the order of ROUS>IL>OH>MI>IN>WI; and (iv) the usage 
of each region’s output is largely consistent with actual statistics.  For example, 
according to the simulation result, 48.0% of IL’s output is sold as intermediate input; 
37.3% as consumption goods; and 14.7% as investment goods while actual IO table 
shows that 50.3% of output produced in IL are purchased for input, 40.2% for 
consumption and 9.5% for investment (see table 3.8).  
 There exists a noteworthy gap in per-capita output across the regions according to 
the simulation results (table 3.9).  Simulation and actual statistics point out that the state 
with the lowest per-capita output among the five Midwest states is Michigan; and the 
state with the highest per-capita output is Illinois.  It should be noted that one of the 
reasons for the discrepancy between simulation result and actual data could be attributed 
to ignoring the differences of the technology level across the regions in the simulation    
model.  Also the assumption that there is no external trade may bias the estimation.  
Further, it is also clear that the economy of the US was not in steady state in 2007.  
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Therefore, it is only with some degree of probability that the steady-state simulation 
result and the actual statistics should not be entirely consistent with each other. 
 The gaps of investment in physical capital and human capital play a key role in 
achieving different level of per-capita output in the simulation model.  Table 3.10 shows 
that ROUS and IL invest 17.1% and 16.2% of their output while IN, WI, MI and OH 
allocate only 12.2%, 13.1%, 13.6% and 14.2% of their output in physical investment.  
This difference in investment tendency is related to the rate of rental return (see table 
3.12 for factor prices): household agents would more inclined to consume the goods 
rather than save and invest them when the rental return becomes relatively low (or is 
expected to become low in the dynamic model.)   
 Also, the educational attainment could be a major factor in determining the 
difference of economic performance (here, per-capita output) since the educational 
investment is directly linked to the improvement of the human capital stock or 
productivity in our model.  It is very certain in this model that the regions with higher 
per-capita output tend to combine inputs such as physical capital and labor force with a 
higher level of productivity.  Table 3.11 shows the average time share spent in 
educational investment across the regions: IN, MI, WI and OH spend apparently less time 
in education than ROUS and IL.  Accordingly, there should be subsequent gaps in human 
capital stock across the regions: figure 3.2 shows the discrepancies of the age-
productivity profile (or human capital stock).   
 There is a notable gap between two groups: high skilled region and less skilled 
regions.  The high skilled region are ROUS and IL; and less skilled region consist of IN, 
MI, OH and WI.  For example, the average worker at the retirement age in the high 
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skilled region (that is ROUS and IL) is 36.8% more productive than the worker at the 
same age in the less skilled region (that is IN, MI, OH and WI).  This simulation result is 
consistent with the statistics of labor productivity between the regions:  the labor statistics 
shows that IL and ROUS is the leading region in terms of labor productivity (the last row 
in table 3.11).  Again, these gaps in productivity are attributed mainly to the differences 
of time spent on educational investment (table 3.11) and also the level of physical capital 
stock in the six-regional economies according to the model specifications (see 3.24). 
 Finally, Table 3.12 shows the regional prices such as output, consumption and 
investment price as well as production factors.  The gaps of goods prices between the 
regions are larger than the actual CPI presented in the table 3.2.  However, the order of 
prices matches well with the actual CPI level except MI: The simulation results under-
estimates the consumption price in MI, compared to the table 3.2.  Also, the simulation 
results imply that renting physical capital and hiring one unit of labor cost the most in the 
ROUS; on the contrary, the least region is IN.   
 Another steady state result can be generated with the different age-cohort 
structure in order to obtain the insight of impact of population ageing on the economy.  
The Census Bureau expects that the population ageing process will accelerate over time 
(table 3.13).  According to the projection of the Census Bureau, the number of people 
between 15 and 64 will decline in the Midwest from 2007 to 2030.  On the contrary, the 
number of people above 65 will grow at a significant rate.  In particular, in the ROUS, the 
number of people of age 65+ will almost double from 2007 to 2030.   
 Without any change of model specification, the steady state simulation was 
implemented with the projected age-cohort structure for the year 2030.  It is very 
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important to note that this steady state result does not reflect the dynamic changes of the 
human capital level of households in each region.  In other words, the steady-state result 
in this section reflects the changes of human capital level only between the generations, 
but does not consider the changes of human capital stock along the time dimension.  
However, the dynamic simulation, the result of which will be described in the next 
section, will reflect the endogenous growth of human capital stock along the time 
dimension as well as between the generations.  Furthermore, the changes of human 
capital- related variables would play a critical role in simulating the dynamics of the six 
regions’ economies.   
 Table 3.14 shows the comparison of per-capita output under the two different age-
cohort structures.  The results are quite intuitive: due to the population ageing, per-capita 
output under the age-cohort structure in 2030 is less than per-capita output under the age-
cohort structure in 2007 in every region.  It should be noticed that the per-capita output in 
OH under the demographic scenario of 2030 does not decline so much from the level 
under the scenario of 2007.  The number of people belonging to the working age (15-64) 
in OH declines faster than the other region from 2007 through 2030; subsequently the 
total population size (15+) grows at only 1.4% (table 3.13).  On the contrary, it grows at 
24.6% in the ROUS and 10.6% in the WI.  The relative faster growth of the external 
demand mitigates the negative impact of population ageing to some extent.  This positive 
effect from the external economy is reflected by the relative price changes: the demand 
growth from the growing population in the other regions and the limited supply of the 
good produced in OH (owing to drop of labor force) causes the improvement of the terms 
of trade for OH, assuming that the goods produced in each region are imperfect 
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substitutes each other.  As shown in figure 3.3, the growth of the relative output price of 
OH from 2007 through 2030 is the highest among 5 Midwest states, reflecting the 
improving terms of trade for OH.   
 
3.4.2 Results of dynamic simulation 
3.4.2.1 Dynamics of age-cohort population structure 
The main origin of dynamics of the regional economies in this chapter should be 
population ageing: in particular, the dynamic simulation is focused on the demographic 
change from 2007 through 2030.  The panels in figure 3.4 show the changes of age-
cohort structure of each region.  Again note that the total population size of IL in 2007 in 
this simulation is normalized to be a unit (
65
, , 2007
1
1j IL g t
g
N
= =
=
=∑ ).  It is apparent that the 
population ageing process is becoming more important in every one of the six regions 
from 2007 through 2030.  This chapter assumes that the age-cohort structure and 
population size of each region after 2030 is same as those for 203036.   
 
3.4.2.2 Outcomes 
The results presented in this section should be different from what we have seen in the 
previous section since the agents are assumed to react to the expectation of future price 
development caused by the demographic changes in the dynamic simulation model.  In 
the steady-state simulation, the price variables are assumed to be constant permanently. 
                                                 
36
 This could be strict assumption in the dynamic simulation since the individuals respond sensitively to the 
movement of economic variables in the future.  Thus it is quite desirable to get the projection of age-cohort 
population strucuture as long as possible for the dynamic simulation like the model in this chapter. 
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 Table 3.15 shows the per-capita output in 2007 and 2030 for each region (see the 
appendix for the detailed figures).  Unlike the results shown in the previous section, the 
dynamic simulation demonstrates that the per-capita output will grow positively even 
though there will be a fast growing population ageing phenomenon.  As shown in the 
previous two chapters, this is because individual’s endogenous choice in educational 
investment mitigates the negative effects of population ageing to some extent thru 
improving the overall productivity in the corresponding economy during the transition.  
Furthermore, the simulation results projects that IN and MI will grow 22.9% and 19.6% 
respectively while IL and ROUS grow at 2.2% and 3.6%.  Figure 3.5 shows the size of 
per-capita output, compared to 2007: it shows that IN and MI are growing relatively fast.  
However, notice that the growth of 22.8% (IN) for 23 years (2007 thru 2030) is still very 
low: it amounts to 0.9% per year.  Also, note that ROUS and IL will produce most per 
worker; and MI produces least per worker still in 2030 (see the appendix).  
 In the economy that the model describes, the physical capital and human capital 
complement each other.  In terms of human capital, higher human capital stock makes the 
combination of labor and physical capital more effective; consequently, the combination 
promotes the economic growth.  This economic growth induces the physical capital stock 
to be built up more since the economy produces more per unit of input than before.  
However, as the physical capital stock per labor grows, the marginal return to investment 
in human capital stock decreases (see the human capital technology equation 3.24); and 
workers react less unfavorably to increasing their investment time more in their human 
capital.  This reluctance in increasing educational investment decelerates the economic 
growth; and consequently lowers the growth of physical capital stock.  Overall, in the 
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region of higher human capital stock and physical capital stock, the growth of human 
capital stock and physical capital stock is relatively low.  In our simulation, IL and ROUS 
have the highest level of physical capital per worker and human capital among the six 
regions in 2007 (see the 2nd and 3rd section in the table 3.16).  On the contrary, IN and MI 
have the lowest average physical capital and human capital stock, implying the marginal 
return to education in IN and MI is higher than the other area.  So the workers in IN and 
MI will increase their educational investment more rapidly than those in ROUS and IL.  
This conjecture is consistent with the simulation results: the first section of table 3.16 
shows that educational investment in IN and MI grows at 14.2% and 12.8% respectively 
while ROUS and IL grow at 1.4% and 2.4% respectively from 2007 thru 2030.  Thus, the 
growth of human capital stock and physical capital stock per worker in IN and MI is 
higher than the other regions; and those in ROUS and IL is less than the other regions.  
However, note that ROUS and IL would still lead the other regions in terms of amount of 
time spent in educational investment, average human capital stock and average physical 
capital stock per worker in 2030.  
 Population ageing will generally cause the wage rate to increase since a large 
number of retired persons will cause the labor force to decline compared to the other 
production factor (physical capital).  Consistent with this notion, the wage rates in every 
one of the six regions increases from 2007 to 2030 according to the simulation results 
(see upper panel in figure 3.6).  However, the growth rate of the wage rate is different 
across the regions.  For example, OH and WI are projected to experience higher increase 
of wage rates than any other region.  As shown in the first order condition (3.5), there 
exist two prime forces to influencing the wage rate in each region: one is the relative 
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scarcity of labor and the other is the remaining aggregate region’s output price together 
with the parameters representing the preference for each region’s output as an 
intermediate good.  The former is linked positively; and the latter is linked negatively 
with the movement of the wage rate.  First, IN, MI and WI are the top 3 regions where 
the labor (joined with human capital stock) will become scarce more rapidly than the 
other regions (see the 3rd section in the table 3.16).  So the wage rate in WI is projected to 
show a higher growth rate (+14.8%).  However, IN and MI will not show a high 
increasing tendency in the wage rate even though the labor force will become scarce 
relatively rapidly.  This is because their terms of trade are projected to deteriorate from 
2007 through 2030.  Figure 3.6 shows that output price of IN, ROUS and MI will 
decrease 3.4%, 1.2% and 1.0% during the period while the output price of the goods 
produced in OH will grow at 8.7%.  The wage rate in OH will experience the upward 
pressure from the improving terms of trade (which means a decline in the relative output 
price in the other regions).  The terms of trade of ROUS will deteriorate since its demand 
for the goods produced in the Midwest states will grow more rapidly than the Midwest 
states’ demand for the goods produced in ROUS, taking the population growth projection 
in the table 3.13.  However, IN and MI will receive a smaller benefit from this declining 
terms of trade in ROUS since ROUS’ demand for the goods produced in IN and MI is 
relatively low, compared to the other Midwest states.  Table 3.17 compares the 
preference parameter of ROUS fixed in the previous calibration procedure (note that the 
elasticity of substitution across the regions was set to be identical across the regions in 
the previous section).  The parameters representing the preference of ROUS for the goods 
produced in IN and MI as intermediate input, consumption and investment goods are low, 
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compared to the other regions.  Also the goods produced in IN and MI will be relatively 
abundant in 2030, compared to 2007, thanks to the rapid increase of per-capita output in 
these regions as analyzed before.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
In the last section, the simulation results were presented to explore two issues: one is how 
significantly the educational motive mitigates the negative impact of faster growing 
number of elderly people (65+); and the other is how each state affects each other during 
the population ageing era.  According to the last section, the steady state results reveal 
that each region will grow negatively in sense of per-capita output from 2007 through 
2030 even though there will be some differences of degree of deterioration across the 
regions.   
 However, dynamic simulation results imply that the economy in every region will 
show the positive growth during the period thanks to a prominent underlying force of 
economic growth: human capital.  Also, it was shown that there exist the eventual 
interactions of demographics and terms of trade of each region through the mechanisms 
of demand and supply of the goods; further, these interactions substantially affect the 
development of factor prices.  Incorporating the information from the multi-regional 
input-output within the dynamic OLG framework worked well in simulating the 
mechanism of demand and supply forces at the intermediate good, consumption and 
investment good markets.   
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 The simulation results implied that the per-capita output of IN and MI would 
grow relatively rapidly from 2007 thru 2030, taking the expected demographic 
developments and endogenous growth mechanism into considerations.  However, it 
should be noted that the per-capita output simulated in the last section should be 
understood as a concept of potential output: the highest sustainable level of output that 
the corresponding economy can produce by efficiently combining its every inputs such as 
labor, capital and technology.  Thus, the simulation result regarding the growth of per-
capita output just reveals that the negative impacts of population ageing in IN and MI 
could be mitigated more than the other regions due to human capital formation 
mechanism.  To realize this potential, it is critical that there should be no formal or 
informal hindrance for the workers to implement their optimal decisions on educational 
investment.  In practice, the regional government should encourage the workers to invest 
their time in improving their human capital stock by fiscal policy so that the economy 
could mitigate the negative impact from the population ageing (see chapter 2 for the 
detailed analysis); and follow the track presented in the last section.  Meanwhile, it was 
shown that IN and MI would be ones where the output price will be declining during the 
aging period.  The deterioration of terms of trade will result in a decline in the wage rate, 
implying that the worker’s welfare would be undermined in these regions.  Thus, while 
encouraging the worker to invest more time in improving his/her human capital stock as 
described above, the firms should try to build up the industrial relationship with the 
institutions outside the Midwest so that their goods could be demanded more than before 
as intermediate inputs, as well as consumption and investment goods by the regions 
outside the Midwest states.  
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 For the highly developed region like ROUS and IL in terms of per-capita physical 
capital stock and human capital stock level, there exist underlying threats stemming from 
the population ageing since the human capital growth could be sluggish in the near future 
in these regions.  Thus, the political effort should be concentrated on shifting the human 
capital stock formation function itself.  One of the policies for consideration would be 
upgrading the educational environment, either through institutional or non-institutional 
settings, of the group with the lower human capital stock such as international immigrants 
and African-Americans.  Upgrading the learning ability during the early period of life of 
the people in the lower-skilled group could shift upward the post-school human capital 
stock formation of the corresponding community.  The previous chapter 2 showed that 
this kind of upgrading of human capital stock formation technology corresponding to the 
African-American society in Illinois benefits the whole economic agents in Illinois 
substantially in the long run under a population ageing scenario. 
 This chapter assumes that the household agent is immobile between the states.  
However, as this chapter reveals in the previous section, the heterogeneous demographic 
change across the regions causes the dynamic movements of factor prices and different 
growth of physical and human capital stock across the regions.  These effects of regional 
demographic changes may provide a portion of regional residents with the incentives to 
migrate between the regions to seek higher wage rates and/or higher returns to education 
and so forth.  Empirically, Illinois is considered to be the number two state after New 
York in terms of retirement outmigration according the data analysis of 2008 American 
Community Survey (ACS); and as Yu (2009) analyzed, the fund outflows stemming from 
the retirement outmigration pattern negatively affect the regional economy.  Thus it is 
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desirable to extend the model presented in this chapter 3 to incorporate the migration of 
active labor and retirees.  For this extension, the uninsurable idiosyncratic shock related 
to the skill factor (say) should be included in the model; and the revealed history of 
shocks makes each individual to be heterogeneous in terms of skill level.  This 
heterogeneity of skill level and subsequently difference of expected life-time income will 
cause individuals to reveal a different pattern in choosing whether to stay or not during 
each period in which the model is run.  For example, one might expect that highly skilled 
and unskilled workers would exhibit a different pattern of optimizing their choice on 
whether to out-migrate or not.  As Basile and Lim (2006) have demonstrated, there needs 
to be additional consideration of the decision to migrate and the actual time when the 
migration takes place.  Different factors may influence each part of this two-stage process. 
 Finally, as mentioned before presenting the simulation results, this chapter 
assumed that the age-cohort population structure will be maintained after 2030.  It is 
highly possible that this assumption may generate a distortion of projection to some 
extent especially in the later period near 2030 since the economic agents in the simulation 
model optimize their choices based on the expectation of future economic variables; and 
future economic variables are substantially influenced by demographics.  For generating 
more plausible outcomes, the longer term dynamics of age-cohort population structure in 
each region should be generated.  In other words, more rigorous way in obtaining the 
age-cohort population structure is desired instead of depending entirely on the relatively 
short-term population data provided by the Census Bureau. 
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Figure 3.1: Age-cohort population structure 
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Figure 3.2: Steady state results- Age profile of human capital stock 
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Figure 3.3: Percentage growth of (relative) regional output prices from 2007 to 2030 
according to the steady-state simulation 
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Figure 3.4: Age-cohort population structures of the each region (to be incorporated into 
the simulation) 
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Figure 3.5: Growth of per-capita output in each region (2007=1) 
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Figure 3.6: Change of wage rate (upper) and output price (lower) from 2007 thru 2030 
from the dynamic simulation 
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Table 3.1: Expenditure quantity of each region’s industry in 2007 
  IL IN MI OH WI ROUS Total 
I L 1,622  73  52  45  51  638  2,482  
I N 55  841  42  69  14  236  1,257  
M I 42  37  1,078  99  49  315  1,621  
O H 35  75  110  1,310  16  529  2,075  
W I 38  11  46  12  779  228  1,115  
ROUS 698  337  458  715  331  40,245  42,784  
Intermediate 
purchases 
across 
regions 
Intermediate total 2,490  1,375  1,786  2,249  1,240  42,192  51,333  
 Employee Compensation 1,742  728  1,157  1,381  699  32,459  38,166  
 Proprietary Income 220  81  142  138  64  4,509  5,154  
 Other Property Income 864  353  547  630  330  16,430  19,154  
 Indirect Business Taxes (A) 224  87  143  162  80  4,262  4,959  
 VA total 3,049    1,249     1,989      2,312      1,173     57,660     67,433  
Value Added 
 VA total – (A) 2,826    1,162     1,846      2,150      1,093     53,398     62,474  
Institutions (B) 12  9  10  13  6  196  246  
Foreign Import (C) 117  88  111  141  58  5,502  6,017  
Total 5,669  2,721  3,896  4,715  2,478  105,550  125,029  
Total – (A) – (B) – (C) 5,316  2,537  3,632  4,399  2,333  95,590  113,807  
 
 
Table 3.2: Consumer price index of each region in 2007 
Region Coverage CPI  
IL Chicago-Gary-Kenosha, IL-IN-WI 204.8 
IN Cincinnati-Hamilton, OH-KY-IN 193.9 
MI Detroit-Ann Arbor-Flint, MI 200.1 
OH Cleveland-Akron, OH 196.0 
WI Milwaukee-Racine, WI 194.1 
ROUS US city average 205.7 
                  Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics (www.bls.gov) 
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Table 3.3: Parameter values in production function 
 IL (j=1) IN (j=2) MI (j=3) OH (j=4) WI (j=5) ROUS (j=6) 
IL ( 1 jz ) 0.3052 0.0288 0.0142 0.0102 0.0220 0.0067 
IN ( 2 jz ) 0.0104 0.3314 0.0116 0.0156 0.0062 0.0025 
MI ( 3 jz ) 0.0079 0.0147 0.2968 0.0226 0.0210 0.0033 
OH ( 4 jz ) 0.0066 0.0298 0.0302 0.2977 0.0067 0.0055 
WI ( 5 jz ) 0.0071 0.0043 0.0128 0.0027 0.3340 0.0024 
ROUS ( 6 jz ) 0.1312 0.1330 0.1261 0.1625 0.1417 0.4210 
Value Added (
,VA jz ) 0.5316 0.4580 0.5083 0.4887 0.4684 0.5586 
       
Labor income share (1- jα ) 0.6166 0.6262 0.6269 0.6425 0.6394 0.6079 
Capital income share ( jα ) 0.3834 0.3738 0.3731 0.3575 0.3606 0.3921 
 
Table 3.4: Expenditure quantity of each region’s consumption and investment in 2007 
 IL IN MI OH WI ROUS Total 
Consumption        
IL 1,528 35 31  25 23  342 1,984  
IN 28  636  17  29  6  101  817  
MI 25  15  1,029  50  22  176  1,317  
OH 22  31  55  1,164  8  291  1,571  
WI 26  5  28  7 622  123  812  
ROUS 367  129  224  341  137  36,430  37,628  
Total 1,997  851  1,384  1,616  817  37,463  44,129  
Investment        
IL 435  2  2  2  2  28  471  
IN 7  241  9  11  2  24  293  
MI 10  6  338  24  8  59  445  
OH 5  7  22  350  2  59  446  
WI 6  1  4  5  220  11   247  
ROUS 52  23  69  74  23  9,748  9,989  
Total 515  279  445  466  257  9,930  11,892  
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Table 3.5: Regional preference parameter values in consumption and investment function 
           
   
IL (j=1) IN (j=2) MI (j=3) OH (j=4) WI (j=5) ROUS (j=6) 
Consumption        
IL ( 1,c jυ ) 0.7666 0.0434 0.0226 0.0160 0.0293 0.0091 
IN ( 2,c jυ ) 0.0134 0.7367 0.0121 0.0176 0.0066 0.0025 
MI ( 3,c jυ ) 0.0121 0.0184 0.7405 0.0311 0.0274 0.0046 
OH ( 4,c jυ ) 0.0107 0.0359 0.0390 0.7113 0.0095 0.0074 
WI ( 5,c jυ ) 0.0122 0.0059 0.0198 0.0043 0.7509 0.0031 
ROUS ( 6,c jυ ) 0.1851 0.1597 0.1661 0.2197 0.1763 0.9733 
Investment       
IL ( 1,I jυ )     0.8458     0.0072     0.0051     0.0050    0.0064     0.0029 
IN ( 2,I jυ )     0.0121     0.8562     0.0194     0.0236     0.0064     0.0023 
MI ( 3,I jυ )     0.0186     0.0235     0.7593     0.0515     0.0319     0.0057 
OH ( 4,I jυ )     0.0101     0.0234     0.0480     0.7444     0.0089     0.0057 
WI ( 5,I jυ )     0.0111     0.0028     0.0087     0.0102     0.8498     0.0010 
ROUS ( 6,I jυ )     0.1023     0.0869     0.1596     0.1654     0.0965     0.9824 
 
Table 3.6: Dependency ratio of each region in 2007 
IL IN MI OH WI ROUS 
18.04% 18.54% 18.33% 20.11% 19.39% 18.70% 
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Table 3.7: Steady state results with age-cohort structure in 2007- Regional input-output table 
 
 Intermediary Input Consumption Investment Total 
 IL IN MI OH WI RS Sub- total IL IN MI OH WI RS 
Sub- 
total IL IN MI OH WI RS 
Sub- 
total  
IL 2.440 0.094 0.069 0.061 0.065 1.106 3.835 2.274 0.030 0.027 0.029 0.022 0.600 2.982 1.082 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.084 1.176 7.993 
IN 0.083 1.079 0.057 0.094 0.018 0.413 1.743 0.052 0.676 0.019 0.042 0.007 0.217 1.013 0.020 0.352 0.014 0.024 0.003 0.087 0.500 3.256 
MI 0.063 0.048 1.447 0.136 0.062 0.545 2.300 0.047 0.017 1.153 0.074 0.028 0.400 1.719 0.031 0.010 0.532 0.052 0.014 0.217 0.856 4.875 
OH 0.053 0.097 0.147 1.787 0.020 0.908 3.011 0.036 0.028 0.052 1.443 0.008 0.547 2.113 0.015 0.008 0.029 0.639 0.003 0.184 0.878 6.002 
WI 0.057 0.014 0.062 0.016 0.986 0.396 1.531 0.043 0.005 0.028 0.009 0.687 0.245 1.017 0.017 0.001 0.006 0.009 0.336 0.035 0.403 2.951 
RS 1.049 0.433 0.615 0.975 0.418 69.489 72.978 0.536 0.109 0.191 0.388 0.132 62.654 64.009 0.128 0.027 0.083 0.124 0.031 27.627 28.019 165.01 
VA 4.249 1.491 2.478 2.933 1.382 92.200                  
Output 7.99 3.26 4.87 6.00 2.95 165.06                  
Note: RS in the table indicates ROUS 
 
 112 
Table 3.8: Percentage of usage of each region’s output (%) 
  Intermediary Input Consumption Investment 
IL Simulation 47.97 37.31 14.72 
 Actual data 50.27 40.19 9.54 
IN Simulation 53.54 31.11 15.35 
 Actual data 53.11 34.52 12.38 
MI Simulation 47.18 35.26 17.56 
 Actual data 47.92 38.93 13.15 
OH Simulation 50.17 35.21 14.62 
 Actual data 50.71 38.39 10.90 
WI Simulation 51.88 34.47 13.65 
 Actual data 51.29 37.35 11.36 
ROUS Simulation 44.23 38.79 16.98 
 Actual data 47.33 41.62 11.05 
 
  Table 3.9: Per-capita output 
 IL IN MI OH WI ROUS 
Simulation 0.9704 0.8036 0.7286 0.7990 0.7996 1.0000 
Actual data 1.0729 0.8885 0.8442 0.8835 0.9197 1.0000 
Note: 1. Numbers of ROUS is normalized to a unit.  
          2. Actual data is calculated by GSP (Gross State Product) excluding public sectors ÷ population 
estimation in 2007.  
Source: BEA (www.bea.gov) for GSP; and Census Bureau for population estimation. 
 
Table 3.10: Steady-state results- Investment-output ratio 
 IL IN MI OH WI ROUS 
 Physical Investment  (A) 1.2911 0.3982 0.6625 0.8502 0.3876 28.2210 
 Output (B) 7.9929 3.2557 4.8748 6.0022 2.9510 165.0061 
 Investment-Output  
 ratio (A / B) 0.1615 0.1223 0.1359 0.1416 0.1313 0.1710 
 
Table 3.11: Steady-state results- Time share of educational investment and average 
human capital stock 
 IL IN MI OH WI ROUS 
Time share in education (%) 13.18 10.42 10.55 11.42 10.97 13.55 
Avg. human capital stock    2.27   1.77   1.78   1.94   1.85   2.39 
Gross State Product / Annual 
Employment: 1998 thru 20071) 80.52 67.77 74.88 68.94 65.06 78.66 
Note: 1) Unit: thousand dollars chained with 2000 price level. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and 
Bureau of Economic Analysis 
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Table 3.12: Steady state results- Prices 
 IL IN MI OH WI ROUS 
Production  0.9783 0.7619 0.7611 0.8816 0.8316 1.0000 
 Consumption  0.9720 0.8085 0.8057 0.9010 0.8608 0.9963 Goods price 
 Investment 0.9701 0.7841 0.8011 0.8892 0.8457 0.9968 
Rental return (physical capital) 0.0857 0.0648 0.0662 0.0723 0.0690 0.0888 
    Wage rate 1.5363 0.9494 0.9717 1.2228 1.1041 1.6090 
 
Table 3.13: Growth of population size (age 15+) from 2007 to 2030 
Age IL IN MI OH WI ROUS 
 15-64 0.9665 0.9873 0.9474 0.9105 0.9750 1.1163 
 65+ 1.5595 1.5774 1.6320 1.5261 1.7803 1.9415 
 15+ 1.0571 1.0796 1.0535 1.0136 1.1057 1.2464 
Dependency 
ratio 
18.04% → 
29.10% 
(+11.1%p) 
18.54% → 
29.63% 
(+11.1%p) 
18.33% → 
31.57% 
(+13.2%p) 
20.11% → 
33.70% 
(+13.6%p) 
19.39% → 
35.40% 
(+16.1%p) 
18.70% → 
32.53% 
(+13.8%p) 
  Source: Census Bureau’s projection 
 
Table 3.14: Steady state result- Per-capita output under the alternative age-cohort 
structures 
 IL IN MI OH WI ROUS 
2007: A 7.9932 6.6194 6.0017 6.5813 6.5866 8.2374 
2030: B 7.3336 6.1256 5.6248 6.4631 6.1252 6.6928 Per-capita 
output 
B/A 0.9175 0.9254 0.9372 0.9820 0.9299 0.8125 
 
 
Table 3.15: Per-capita output from the dynamic simulation results 
 IL IN MI OH WI ROUS 
2007: A 7.6775 5.7624 5.3164 6.1117 5.9618 7.9339 
2030: B 7.8491 7.0798 6.3597 6.4586 6.5759 8.2189 Per-capita 
output 
B/A 1.0224 1.2286 1.1962 1.0568 1.1030 1.0359 
 
 114 
Table 3.16: Average physical capital per effective labor and human capital stock per 
labor  
 2007 (A) 2010 2020 2030 (B) B/A 
IL 0.1204 0.1205 0.1218 0.1233 1.0241 
IN 0.0967 0.1007 0.1069 0.1104 1.1417 
MI 0.0980 0.1015 0.1073 0.1105 1.1276 
OH 0.1073 0.1089 0.1117 0.1139 1.0615 
WI 0.1022 0.1049 0.1090 0.1110 1.0861 
Educational 
investment 
(fraction of 
endowment 
time) 
ROUS 0.1263 0.1262 0.1269 0.1281 1.0143 
IL 0.9485 0.9611 0.9971 1.0565 1.1139 
IN 0.7393 0.7258 0.7733 0.8618 1.1657 
MI 0.7448 0.7335 0.7800 0.8676 1.1649 
OH 0.8104 0.8093 0.8414 0.9062 1.1182 
WI 0.7725 0.7657 0.8049 0.8803 1.1395 
Human capital 
stock  
(ROUS in 2007 
= 1) 
ROUS 1.0000 1.0236 1.0757 1.1384 1.1384 
IL 0.9394 0.9251 0.9514 0.9451 1.0061 
IN 0.5702 0.6696 0.8387 0.8709 1.5272 
MI 0.5955 0.6834 0.8389 0.8782 1.4747 
OH 0.7198 0.7487 0.8326 0.8523 1.1842 
WI 0.6451 0.7075 0.8337 0.8622 1.3365 
Physical 
capital/effective 
labor 
(ROUS in 2007 
=1) 
ROUS 1.0000 0.9806 1.0214 1.0454 1.0454 
 
Table 3.17: Preference parameter of ROUS 
 IL IN MI OH WI ROUS 
Intermediate input .0067 .0025 .0033 .0055 .0024 .4210 
Consumption  .0091 .0025 .0046 .0074 .0031 .9733 
Investment .0029 .0023 .0057 .0057 .0010 .9824 
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Appendix A: Estimation of the Initial Human Capital Stock Distribution over Age-Cohorts 
in Chapter 2 
 
In order to get the initial age-profile of human capital stock, we set up the following regression 
model: 
log(annual earnings) = const.+ β1 age+ β2 d_black+ β3 d_others+ β4 age·d_black+ β5 age·d_others+ ε  
log(annual earnings) = const.+ β1 age+ β2 d_domestic+ β3 d_int’l+ β4 age·d_domestic+ β5 age·d_int’l+ ε  
where d_black, d_others, d_domestic and d_int’l denotes the dummy variables representing Black, 
Others, domestic in-migrants and international immigrants respectivly. The right-hand side 
variables include the interaction of dummy and age variables to capture the heterogeneity of 
growth and levels of earnings from belonging to a certain race or migration status.  Data set is 
same as the one for the former estimations in the section 2.2.  Following table demonstrates the 
estimation results. 
 
 Table A.1: Estimation results for estimating age-earning profile 
 
Grouping by  
races 
 
 
 
Grouping by 
migration status 
constant 9.4305 (0.0168)  constant 
9.3224 
(0.0153)  
age 0.0168 (0.0004)     age 
0.0187 
(0.0003) 
d_black -0.8874 (0.0535)     d_domestic 
-0.7452 
(0.1055)     
d_others -0.4740 (0.0490)      d_int’l 
-1.3222 
(0.2143) 
age · d_black 0.0141 (0.0012)      age · d_domestic 
0.0196 
(0.0030)      
age · d_others 0.0114 (0.0012)       age · d_int’l 
0.0234 
(0.0060)     
obs. 67,646  obs. 67,646 
R2 0.0530  R2 0.0472 
              Note: standard errors are denoted inside the parenthesis. 
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 From these results, we get the following estimation of age-earning relationship for each 
groups such as: 
‣ log(annual earnings)=8.5431+ 0.0309*age for Black,  
‣ log(annual earnings)=9.4305+0.0168*age for White,  
‣ log(annual earnings)=8.9565+0.0282*age for Others, 
‣ log(annual earnings)=9.3224+0.0187*age for natives, 
‣ log(annual earnings)=8.0002+0.0421*age for international immigrants and 
‣ log(annual earnings)=8.5772+0.0383*age for domestic in-migrants. 
 
 Now we can get the estimates of logged annual earnings of each age-cohort for every 
group.  The differences of estimated logged annual earnings of a certain age-cohort between the 
groups mean the ratio of annual earnings of that age-cohort between the groups.  Now we 
assume two things: (i) the annual earnings perfectly reflect the human capital stock (or 
productivity) shown by the laborer for one year and (ii) the average of estimates of human capital 
stock distribution across the groups (i.e., races and migration status) are exactly same as the 
initial human capital stock distribution adopted in the chapter 1.   
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Appendix B: Key Variables from Dynamic Simulation Results in Chapter 3 
 
(1) Per-capita output 
 2007 (A) 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 (B) B/A 
IL 7.6775 7.7364 7.7744 7.7934 7.7942 7.8491 1.0224 
IN 5.7624 5.9814 6.2942 6.5838 6.8300 7.0798 1.2286 
MI 5.3164 5.4831 5.7250 5.9501 6.1436 6.3597 1.1962 
OH 6.1117 6.1815 6.2491 6.3104 6.3594 6.4586 1.0568 
WI 5.9618 6.0851 6.2454 6.3742 6.4676 6.5759 1.1030 
ROUS 7.9339 8.0432 8.1170 8.1429 8.1242 8.2189 1.0359 
 
(2) Fraction of time-spending in educational investment (average per worker) 
 2007 (A) 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 (B) B/A 
IL 0.1204 0.1205 0.1210 0.1218 0.1229 0.1233 1.0241 
IN 0.0967 0.1007 0.1045 0.1069 0.1091 0.1104 1.1417 
MI 0.0980 0.1015 0.1050 0.1073 0.1093 0.1105 1.1276 
OH 0.1073 0.1089 0.1105 0.1117 0.1132 0.1139 1.0615 
WI 0.1022 0.1049 0.1076 0.1090 0.1104 0.1110 1.0861 
ROUS 0.1263 0.1262 0.1265 0.1269 0.1277 0.1281 1.0143 
 
(3) Human capital stock (average per worker) 
 2007 (A) 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 (B) B/A 
IL 2.2669 2.2971 2.3336 2.3830 2.4479 2.5250 1.1139 
IN 1.7669 1.7347 1.7633 1.8481 1.9524 2.0597 1.1657 
MI 1.7800 1.7530 1.7824 1.8641 1.9662 2.0736 1.1649 
OH 1.9369 1.9342 1.9561 2.0110 2.0837 2.1659 1.1182 
WI 1.8463 1.8300 1.8556 1.9237 2.0108 2.1039 1.1395 
ROUS 2.3900 2.4465 2.5074 2.5709 2.6428 2.7207 1.1384 
 
(4) Rental return to physical capital 
 2007 (A) 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 (B) B/A 
IL 0.0932 0.0946 0.0941 0.0931 0.0931 0.0968 1.0386 
IN 0.1301 0.1177 0.1058 0.0996 0.0965 0.0982 0.7548 
MI 0.1222 0.1121 0.1022 0.0972 0.095 0.0976 0.7987 
OH 0.0985 0.0968 0.0938 0.0924 0.0926 0.0979 0.9939 
WI 0.1102 0.1039 0.0968 0.093 0.0917 0.0952 0.8639 
ROUS 0.0955 0.0965 0.0948 0.0924 0.0909 0.0903 0.9455 
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(5) Wage rate (before tax) 
 2007 (A) 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 (B) B/A 
IL 1.4393 1.4475 1.4796 1.5168 1.5477 1.612 1.1200 
IN 1.3056 1.3643 1.4151 1.4248 1.4176 1.4419 1.1044 
MI 1.2695 1.3234 1.3736 1.3944 1.4032 1.4423 1.1361 
OH 1.3112 1.3485 1.4156 1.4747 1.5273 1.6244 1.2389 
WI 1.3108 1.3475 1.3954 1.4276 1.4489 1.5046 1.1478 
ROUS 1.5243 1.5138 1.5306 1.5556 1.5711 1.5754 1.0335 
 
(6) Output price 
 2007 (A) 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 (B) B/A 
IL 0.9632 0.9707 0.9797 0.9885 0.9991 1.0155 1.0543 
IN 1.0219 1.0164 1.0060 0.9944 0.9864 0.9868 0.9657 
MI 0.9959 0.9927 0.9859 0.9801 0.9787 0.9864 0.9905 
OH 0.9765 0.9853 0.9995 1.0140 1.0320 1.0618 1.0874 
WI 0.9993 0.9978 0.9963 0.9968 1.0011 1.0150 1.0157 
ROUS 0.9804 0.9814 0.9820 0.9822 0.9832 0.9682 0.9876 
 
(7) Consumption price 
 2007 (A) 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 (B) B/A 
IL 0.9672 0.9731 0.9800 0.9867 0.9951 1.0053 1.0394 
IN 1.0103 1.0070 1.0003 0.9926 0.9880 0.9878 0.9777 
MI 0.9912 0.9895 0.9852 0.9815 0.9815 0.9864 0.9952 
OH 0.9786 0.9851 0.9950 1.0050 1.0179 1.0358 1.0585 
WI 0.9947 0.9940 0.9931 0.9936 0.9974 1.0060 1.0114 
ROUS 0.9805 0.9815 0.9822 0.9825 0.9838 0.9695 0.9888 
 
(8) Investment price 
 2007 (A) 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 (B) B/A 
IL 0.9861 0.9916 0.9988 1.0060 1.0142 1.0434 1.0581 
IN 1.0363 1.0307 1.0215 1.0114 1.0039 1.0196 0.9839 
MI 1.0117 1.0087 1.0035 0.9993 0.9982 1.0188 1.0070 
OH 0.9979 1.0035 1.0132 1.0234 1.0357 1.0723 1.0746 
WI 1.0180 1.0157 1.0138 1.0140 1.0168 1.0439 1.0254 
ROUS 1.0001 1.0002 1.0002 1.0002 1.0003 1.0009 1.0008 
 
(9) Social security tax rate 
 2007 (A) 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 (B) B/A 
US 0.1184 0.1195 0.1309 0.1457 0.1601 0.1657 1.3995 
 
